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Background: As the need to achieve the financial protection goal of Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC) continues to grow globally, it is imperative to develop appropriate policy interventions to 
address the financial risks that out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures (OOPDE) in Canada 
poses. Empirical studies of the prevalence and determinants of catastrophic OOPDE (expenditure 
that poses a significant threat to households’ living standards) in Canada are very few and there is 
a paucity of scholarly works in this regard. 
Objectives: i) to assess the current prevalence of financial catastrophe and impoverishment from 
OOPDE; ii) to analyze the factors that are possibly associated with catastrophic OOPDE; and iii) 
to examine the implications of the proposed national Pharmacare plan on the distribution of 
OOPDE. 
Methods: This study used the 2016 Statistics Canada Survey of Household Spending; 11,446 
households were included in the analysis. Catastrophic OOPDE was analysed at several thresholds 
using a novel budget share – capacity to pay approach. Concentration indices were constructed to 
determine which households overshot their budget shares. Canada’s official poverty line was used 
to construct a Pen’s parade to show impoverishment from OOPDE. Further, multivariate logistic 
and partial proportional odds regression models were fitted to investigate the determinants of 
catastrophic OOPDE. 
Results: Residents who are in the working poor income category in Quebec and Prairie provinces 
had a higher risk of incurring catastrophic OOPDE compared to the reference group – the 
households with higher than average income living in Ontario. Type of employment and education 
were also associated with catastrophic OOPDE. Also, households with a lower capacity to pay 
experienced a higher prevalence of incurring catastrophic spending. The Pen’s parade also showed 
most households that fell below the poverty line as a result of OOPDE were in the lower half of 
the income distribution. 
Conclusion: This study revealed that despite the existing public-private mix of prescription drugs 
insurance, some households are being drawn into poverty and for some others, poverty is deepened 
when they make OOPDE. The findings suggest, particularly based on the experience of Quebec, 
that the presence of a mandatory insurance for all residents does not necessarily better protect them 
from financial catastrophe compared with other insurance programs. Instead, the 
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The comprehensiveness principle of the Canada Health Act (CHA)1 requires the provision of 
medical services that are "medically necessary" to all Canadian residents (Government of Canada, 
1984; Flood & Chowdury, 2002; Health Canada, 2005). However, there is ambiguity around the 
term "medically necessary," and there has been no universal public funding for such areas as 
prescription drugs, home-based nursing and other health innovations (Caulfield & Zarzeczny, 
2014; Marchildon, 2005; Caldbick et al., 2015). Public prescription drugs programs in Canada, for 
example, are financed by individual provinces (Daw & Morgan, 2012; Kapur & Basu, 2005). 
These prescription drugs programs vary between provinces regarding who has coverage and what 
types of prescription drugs are covered (Anis, Guh & Wang, 2001; Barnes & Andersen, 2015; 
Demers et al., 2008; Sutherland & Dinh, 2017). In 1997, for instance, Quebec introduced a 
mandatory prescription drug coverage for its residents. The program is mandatory because all 
Quebec residents need to have either government or employer coverage for prescription drugs 
(Daw & Morgan, 2012). Notwithstanding, premiums for the program have increased in recent 
times, making it unaffordable to a lot of Quebec residents (Picard, 2017).  
Further, other provinces have public prescription drugs coverage for seniors and social 
assistance recipients, but these programs also require income-based deductibles and copayments, 
which limit affordability (Caldbick et al., 2015; Hoskins, 2018; Law et al., 2012; McLeod et al., 
 
1 The Canada Health Act (CHA) is the federal government’s legislation regarding the dynamics of a publicly financed 
health care system. The primary objective of the CHA is “to protect, promote and restore the physical and mental 
well-being of residents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or other 
barriers.” (Canada Health Act, 1984, C.6, sec.3).  
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2011, Morgan & Boothe, 2016; Morgan, Daw & Law, 2013). Residents other than seniors or social 
assistance recipients mostly have employer-provided private insurance plans (Daw & Morgan, 
2012; Kapur & Basu, 2005; Law et al., 2012; McLeod et al., 2011). However, the rise in part-time 
employment has also led employers to significantly reduce employee drug coverage plans for 
working-class Canadians (Picard, 2017; Barnes & Andersen, 2015). This disparity in prescription 
drug coverage between and within provinces for Canadian households is also known as the 
Canadian “patchwork” of prescription drugs program (Gagnon, 2014; Morgan, Daw & Law, 
2013). Because of the “patchwork” prescription drug programs, some Canadian residents must pay 
out-of-pocket to fill their prescription drugs (Caldbick et al., 2015; Morgan et al., 2015). Around 
67 percent of households are exposed to out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures (Law et al., 
2012). In total, Canadians paid approximately $6.5 billion as out-of-pocket payment in filling their 
prescriptions in 2014 (Law et al., 2018). 
A lack of universal prescription drug coverage, therefore, implies some Canadians are not 
able to afford the needed prescription drugs (Barnes & Andersen, 2015). The problem of access to 
prescription drugs affects at least 23 percent of Canadian households (Angus Reid Institute, 2015). 
According to Kennedy and Morgan (2006), five to ten percent of Canadians cannot fill their 
prescription drugs due to cost and one in twelve Canadians who are 55 years of age and above still 
suffer from cost-related non-adherence. Another study found that one in ten Canadians cannot fill 
their prescription drugs due to the prohibitive cost associated with paying from out-of-pocket (Law 
et al., 2012). Notwithstanding, pharmaceutical expenditure for prescribed drugs, particularly for 
private sector prescribed drugs (out-of-pocket payment and private insurers payment), continues 
to rise in Canada (Caldbick et al., 2015, CIHI, 2013). The graph below illustrates a visual appraisal 
of the phenomena described above. 
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Data Source: National Health Expenditure Database, Canadian Institute for Health Information. 
 
Out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditure is termed “catastrophic” if they result in a 
significant reduction in standards of living for the households either in the short or long run 
(Kawabata, Xu & Carrin, 2002; Stiglitz, 1988; Van Doorslaer et al., 2006; Wagstaff & Van 
Doorslaer, 2003). That is, if out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures as against total 
expenditure in a given household (this ratio is also known as a budget share) exceeds a given 
threshold such that living standards are disrupted, it is catastrophic for the household (Caldbick et 
al., 2015; McLeod et al., 2011). The financial burden households experience as a result of 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments is crucial and has significant implications for policy 
(Elgazzara et al., 2010; Kimani, 2014; Whitehead, Dahlgren & Evans, 2001; WHO, 2005). First, 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures are not invariably correlated with high health care 
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payments (Su, Kouyate & Flessa, 2006; Wyszewianski, 1986, Xu et al., 2003), and are not 
predictable (Akazili et al., 2017; Arrow, 1963; Kimani, 2014; Kwesi, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 
2015), hence, such payments may be a significant cause of household poverty. Payments may also 
cause households to divert their limited household resources to other household necessities such 
as food, shelter etc. or even sell their assets/borrow to finance such health care payments (Berki, 
1986; Foster, 1994; Löfgren, 2014; McIntyre et al., 2006; O’Donnell et al., 2008; Russell 2004; 
World Bank, 1993; Yip & Hsiao, 2008). Also, households may forgo filling of prescription drugs 
altogether, thereby resulting in private costs from health complications, and social costs on the 
health system (Baeza & Packard, 2005; Gertler & Gruber, 2002; Kesselheim et al., 2015; Law, 
Kratzer & Dhalla, 2014; Sanmartin et al., 2014; WHO 2010).  
On a global level, it is established that every welfare state’s goal is to finance its health care 
in a way that allows its various population groups to have access to the quality health care services 
they need without resulting into financial difficulty or bankruptcy (Akazili, 2010, Limwattanom, 
Tangcharoensathien & Prakongsai, 2007; WHO, 2010). The goal described above is documented 
in literature as the World Health Organizations’ (WHO) Universal Health Coverage (UHC) goal 
(Baeza, & Packard, 2006; Garret, Chowdhury & Pablos-Mendez, 2009; Gwatkin & Ergo, 2011; 
Kutzin, Jakab & Cashin, 2010; Ngcamphalala, 2016). Therefore, compared with market-based 
health care allocation, UHC seeks to achieve equity in health financing, quality and access levels 
(Baeza, & Packard, 2006; Bump, 2010; Chuma & Okungu, 2011; Dye, Reeder & Terry, 2013; 
Mathauer, 2015; Prinja, Kaur & Kumar 2012; Mills et al., 2012; Rodin & De Feranti, 2012). This 
implies a health system financing scheme with a substantial dependence on out-of-pocket payment 
is adjudged as inequitable and unfair primarily because of the potential adverse consequences on 
its  vulnerable population (Ataguba, 2012; Carrin et al., 2008; Kimani, 2014; Knaul et al., 2006; 
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Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015; Löfgren, 2014; Ngcamphalala, 2016; Szende & Culyer, 
2006; WHO, 2010). Conversely, a fair and equitable health system financing scheme should 
protect its population from the catastrophic implication of out-of-pocket health care spending 
(Ataguba, 2012; Akazili et al., 2017; Brearly, Marten & O’Connell, 2013; Bhojani et al., 2012; 
Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 2003).  
As a result, financial protection for Canadian households against catastrophic out-of-pocket 
prescription drug expenses remain a vital policy challenge to be addressed (Law et al., 2012). As 
such, there is a need for policy interventions to mitigate the negative consequences of catastrophic 
out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures (Filmer, Hammer & Prichett, 2002; Hoskins, 2014; 
Kimani, 2014; Musgrove, 2000). In the past five decades, several commissions have considered 
comprehensive prescription drug programs that are accessible to and affordable for all Canadians. 
These proposals were from (1) the 1964 Royal Commission on Health Services, (2) 1997 National 
Forum on Health, (3) 2002 Royal Commission on the Future of Health Care, and (4) 2016-2018 
working group and task force on national Pharmacare (Morgan et al., 2015; Morgan & Boothe, 
2016; Morgan et al., 2016). However, none of these proposals for a comprehensive prescription 
drug program have been implemented (Morgan & Boothe, 2016). Estimating the distribution of 
the financial burden experienced by Canadian households because of out-of-pocket prescription 
drug expenditures is, therefore, the first step towards understanding these initiatives and addressing 
the policy issue (Merlis, 2003; Xu et al., 2003). 
 
1.2 Scholarly Context and Rationale for the Study 
 As documented above, when health payments exceed a particular share of total household 
expenditure, such payments are termed catastrophic (Pradhan & Prescott, 2002; Xu et al., 2003). 
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Although the choice of the threshold is value-laden, a 10 percent threshold is predominantly 
favoured in the literature of health care financial burden (Ranson 2002; Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 
2003). Scholars believe that this threshold represents the point at which households are forced to 
forgo basic needs, incur debt, or become poorer (not being able to afford subsistence living) 
(Russell, 2004). Conversely, Kawabata, Xu and Carrin (2002) and Xu et al., (2003) proposed the 
use of “capacity to pay” at a threshold of 40 percent.  
While the distribution of the financial burden from out-of-pocket health payments using 
budget shares have been conducted in many countries such as the USA, Georgia and Thailand, 
etc., surprisingly, there is a paucity of evidence regarding the financial burden of out-of-pocket 
prescription drug expenditures in Canada (Frenk, Lozano & Gonz´alez-Block, 1994; 
Pannarunothai & Mills, 1997; Skarbinski, 2002; Van Doorslaer et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2003). For 
example, to the best of my knowledge in the last decade, only two scholarly works by McLeod et 
al., (2011) and Caldbick et al., (2015), have attempted to critically assess the financial burden of 
out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in Canada. McLeod et al., (2011) used household-
level data from the 2006 Survey of Household Spending by Statistics Canada, while Caldbick et 
al., (2015) used the 2009 data of the same survey. 
McLeod et al., (2011) categorized the Canadian population into three groups (seniors, 
general population, and social assistance recipients) and assessed the financial burden from out-
of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in Canada. This study indicated that the general 
population in Canada compared to seniors and social assistance recipients experienced a relatively 
lower catastrophic financial burden from out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures. However, 
as suggested in the literature, there exists no consensus on the threshold budget share of household 
expenditure for analytical purposes. Therefore, Calbick et al., (2015) argued that McLeod and 
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colleagues’ use of a single threshold of 10 percent might have underestimated the prevalence of 
the catastrophic financial burden Canadian households experienced. Hence, Caldbick et al., (2015) 
used three lower budget share thresholds of 3 percent, 6 percent, and 9 percent. The scholars 
showed that as high as 8.2 percent of Canadian households experienced a catastrophic financial 
burden from out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures. 
Notwithstanding, the use of the budget share derived by the fraction of out-of-pocket 
prescription drug expenditures to total household expenditure is problematic for policy 
formulation. The methodology does not allow for the fact that wealthier households, when 
compared to poorer households, have a higher probability of exceeding the catastrophic threshold 
without resulting in financial difficulty or poverty (Wasgstaff & Van Doorslaer, 2003). Also, the 
use of budget share does not differentiate among households concerning the disparity in household 
necessities’ expenditure (Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 2003). Lastly, the use of budget share implies 
that all households have equal weight in the estimation of the financial burden. That is, all 
households are counted as equal regardless of the differences in household size (total number of 
individuals in the household) (Xu et al., 2007). However, due to economies of scale for example, 
a household’s food requirement is not necessarily a proportional increase of the household’s size 
(a household of three doesn’t necessarily eat directly thrice as much food). Hence, there is the need 
to employ an “equivalence/proportional scale” in order to ensure accurate comparability to 
estimate the financial burden (Kimani, 2014; Xu et al., 2003). 
In light of the limitations of the budget share methodology, other studies have employed 
statistical simulation to explain differences in prescription drugs coverage for the Canadian 
population (Demers et al., 2008; Grootendorst, 2002; Kapur & Basu, 2005; MacDonald & Potvin, 
2004; Morgan et al., 2015) . Although these simulation studies are essential for policy formulation, 
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they do not capture the actual financial burden resulting from out-of-pocket payments for 
prescription drugs at the basic decision-making unit level of the household (McLeod et al., 2011). 
That is, simulation studies hide the household and individual level distribution of the financial 
burden and focus on the population level. Moreover, simulation studies are based on strong 
assumptions that skew the direction of the results of an analysis. For example, in the work of 
Demers et al. (2008), where premiums for senior residents in New Brunswick were wrongfully 
assumed to be $60 per year as against the correct figure of $89 per month. The disparity led to 
significant changes in the distribution of financial burden as well as in conclusion, earlier reported 
(McLeod et al., 2011; O’Sullivan, 2008).  
In this study, I offer an extension to the literature on the financial burden of prescription drug 
expenditures in Canada by employing a method (an adjusted budget share) that accounts for the 
limitation in the budget share methodology. An improvement to the budget share methodology is 
used to account for household necessities by defining total expenditure in the budget share as less 
of household necessities. This new total expenditure is also known as “non-discretionary 
expenditure” (Xu et al., 2003). The threshold of interest for most countries is 40 percent, but this 
study determined catastrophic events at 3.4 percent, 6.73 percent, and 12 percent as indicated by 
Canadian data and compared the results. This approach better captures the differences between 
households concerning their income. Also, unlike what has been in the Canadian literature so far, 
I use the method of “equivalence scale” to obtain an equivalent household size as a unit of analysis 
as opposed to the use of the given household size in the survey (Deaton & Zaidi, 2002; Kimani, 
2014).  
Further, as a review of the existing literature suggests, it has been almost ten years since the 
last study of the financial burden of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in Canada. The 
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present study uses the 2016 Survey of Household Spending (SHS), provided by Statistics Canada, 
to understand the current financial burden of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures on 
Canadian households. The need to understand the financial burden Canadian households 
experience because of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures is justified in that the 
information is necessary for policy response design, formulation and appropriate targeting 
(Kimani, 2014; Löfgren, 2014). 
1.3 Problem Statement  
As indicated above, out-of-pocket payment for prescription drugs poses a significant financial 
burden on some Canadian households (Caldbick et al., 2015; Law et al., 2015; Law et al., 2018). 
Sometimes, the cost of out-of-pocket payments for prescription drugs on Canadian households are 
high enough to expose them to poverty or prevent them from seeking the necessary treatments 
altogether (Kapur & Basu, 2005; McLeod et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 2015). When households 
must reduce their necessary expenditure to cope with health expenditure, expenditure is 
catastrophic (Kawabata, Xu & Carrin, 2002). Notwithstanding, the Canadian health care system 
has continued to witness path-dependent  health policy changes that have prevented departure from 
the initial designation of medically necessary services to include prescription drugs (Bhatia & 
Coleman, 2003; Canada, 1998; Canada, 2002; Dewa, Hoch & Steele, 2005; Fierlbeck, 2013; 
Marchildon, 2007; Marchildon, 2014; Morgan, Daw & Law, 2013; Romanow, 2002; Wireko, 
2015).  
For three very plausible arguments, Canada, as a country, presents a unique opportunity for 
the study of the financial burden of prescription drug payments. First, Canada is the only country 
with a universal and publicly funded health insurance system without a universal and publicly 
funded insurance for prescription drugs (Boothe, 2017; Morgan, Daw & Law, 2013; Taber, 2015). 
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Compared to other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
counterparts, Canada’s per capita spending on prescription drugs has consistently ranked among 
the highest (Beall, Nickerson & Attaran, 2014; Boothe, 2016; Church, 2015; Gagnon, 2014; 
Morgan et al., 2015). Moreover, in 2017, Canada had the third-highest drugs prices among other 
OECD member countries (Picard, 2017). Although the pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance  
(pCPA) has made significant savings for drugs via bulk purchasing, administrative costs are still 
high because of the absence of a nationally coordinated framework, transparency and cooperation 
among provinces (Benefits Canada, 2016; Dutt, 2014; 2016; Gagnon, 2014; Grant, 2018; Kaur et 
al., 2014; Picard, 2018). Canada’s high per capita drug spending implies that Canadians are more 
exposed to financial catastrophe due to prescription drug expenditures when compared to other 
OECD countries (Ngcamphalala, 2016; Xu et al., 2003). 
Second, in the absence of a universal and publicly financed prescription drugs program, 
empirical evidence continues to show that cost-related non-adherence significantly limits access 
to prescription drugs in Canada (Dewa, Hoch & Steele, 2005; Law et al., 2012; Morgan & Boothe, 
2015, Tang, Ghali & Manns, 2014). It is documented that the intensity of cost-related non-
adherence is as high as 36 percent among Canadians and Canadians sometimes have to skip or 
split prescription drugs doses to ensure that they use the drugs for a longer time (Gupta et al., 2018, 
Law et al., 2018; Taber, 2015). Evidence also suggests that, the intensity of cost-related non-
adherence in Canada depends on factors such as income, employment status, province of 
residence, age, etc. which is against the universality principle2 of the Canada Health Act (Gupta et 
al., 2015; Hennessy, Sanmartin & Ronksley, 2016; Kennedy & Morgan 2006; Morgan & Lee, 
 
2 The universality principle of the CHA documents that provinces ensure that all their residents who are insured be 
entitled “to the insured health services provided for by the plan on uniform terms and conditions” (Canada Health Act, 
1984, sec. 9; p. 6) 
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2017; Piette et al., 2006; Sutherland & Dinh, 2017; Tamblyn et al., 2014). In this regard, this 
study’s results can serve as a policy blueprint for other countries with similar realities as Canada 
regarding out-of-pocket health expenditures.  
Lastly, the federal government proposed the introduction of legislation that institutionalizes 
Canada’s first official poverty line through the “Poverty Reduction Act” (Canada, 2018). The 
poverty line is defined as the required minimum income level needed to meet the necessities of 
life (O’Donnell et al., 2008; Kakwani, 2010).  On August 21, 2018, the federal government of 
Canada published the document “Opportunity for All: Canada’s First Poverty Reduction Strategy” 
that signifies the first politically backed up plan towards poverty reduction in Canada (Canada, 
2018, Corak, 2018; Homer, 2018). The document juxtaposes the positive and normative 
judgements of poverty by analyzing the expenditure costs for modest living as well as other costs 
regarding experiences, stories and views of Canadians with lived experiences of poverty (Canada, 
2018). The targets of Canada’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy3 were set against the poverty rate 
in 2015 1.) decrease poverty rate in Canada by 20 percent in the year 2020 2.) decrease poverty 
rate in Canada by 50 percent in the year 2030 (Canada, 2018). Specifically, Canada’s official 
poverty line is a Market Basket Measure (MBM)4 that will be subject to continuous updates and 
improvements every five years (Corak, 2018; Homer, 2018). The foundation of any poverty-
related analysis depends on the theory of poverty line and having a homogenous poverty line is 
important for unmasking horizontal inequality5 in the society (Kakwani, 2010). It is important to 
 
3 Canada’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy encompasses dignity; opportunity and inclusion; and resilience and 
security. (Statistics Canada. (2018). Canada’s First Poverty Reduction Strategy. Retrieved from 
https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/poverty-reduction/reports/strategy.html 19th 
November, 2018 
4 MBM “is a measure of low income based on the cost of a specified basket of goods and services representing a 
modest, basic standard of living.” (Statistics Canada. 2011). Market Basket Measure. Retrieved from 
https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/ref/dict/pop165-eng.cfm, 19th  November, 2018)   
5 Horizontal inequality is defined as the inequality that results among a population group that are bounded by factors 
such as race, age, class, ethnicity, gender, politics, culture etc. (Stewart, Brown & Cobham 2009). Horizontal 
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note that Canada’s first Poverty Reduction strategy is in line with the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDGs) number one to “End poverty in all its forms everywhere by 2030” 
(Kenny, 2015). 
Despite the arguments presented above, little research has been done on the financial burden 
and catastrophic effects of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in Canada. The very few 
analyses carried out on the financial burden of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in 
Canada (Caldbick et al., 2015; McLeod et al., 2015), as earlier documented, used a limiting budget 
share methodology that has implications for horizontal inequality and policy formulation in 
general. Further, currently, to the best of my knowledge, no study in Canada has examined the 
impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in Canada.  This study 
estimates the catastrophic impact of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures on Canadian 
households using an improved methodology as well as a recent data set. Also, for the first time in 
Canada, estimates the impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures using 
the newly determined national poverty line.    
In summary, the first step to developing appropriate policy responses to the arguments above 
is, therefore, an investigation of the extent of catastrophic and impoverishing effects out-of-pocket 
expenditure for prescription drugs in Canada (Filmer, 2002; Merlis, 2003; Musgrove, 2000; Xu et 
al., 2003). This study fills this literature gap by assessing the catastrophic and impoverishing 
effects of out-of-pocket drug payment of different types of households and provides a better 
understanding of the financial protection effects of drug coverage programs. 
 
 
inequality is important because it tends to be transgenerational and has connotations of marginalization, injustice and 
deprivation and can ultimately lead to violence and social instability if not checked (Stewart, 2016). Vertical inequality 




This dissertation estimates the catastrophic and impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket prescription 
drug expenditures in Canada. The study examines the determinants of the catastrophic out-of-
pocket prescription drug payments in Canada. The study also analyzes the implications of a 
national Pharmacare plan for the distribution of financial catastrophe on Canadian households. 
1.5 Research Questions 
1. What is the prevalence and intensity of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drugs expenses 
in Canada? 
2. What are the possible factors associated with catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug 
expenditures in Canada? That is, what types of households are more likely to incur catastrophic 
expenditure?  
3. What is the implication of the proposed national Pharmacare proposals on the distribution of 
catastrophic of out-of-pocket prescription drugs expenses for different Canadian households? 
1.6 Main Summary of the Thesis 
Based on the analysis of this thesis, none of the initial approaches applied in the existing literature 
measuring the financial risk protection of prescription drug payments programs in Canada 
unmasks vertical inequality. Rather, to measure the level of financial protection, studies must use 
an improved methodology as well as measure the potential implication for impoverishment across 
households and provinces. Given that Canada has a mix of mandatory, employer-based, private, 
provincial and federally administered prescription drugs programs, the combined assessment of 
the catastrophic and impoverishment estimates indirectly evaluates and indicates the realities of 
the extent to which such programs protect Canadian residents. The results of this thesis’ analysis 
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show in summary the following; with the use of Canada’s newly instituted official poverty line, 
the identified working poor income category residents of Prairie and Quebec provinces had a 
higher risk of incurring catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drugs expenditure compared to 
other residents with higher than average income living in Ontario. Also, level of education was 
indirectly related to the risk of incurring catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drugs payments 
in Canada. The Pen’s parade also showed most households that fell below the poverty line as a 
result of out-of-pocket prescription drugs expenditure were in the lower half of the income 
distribution. Furthermore, across provinces, poverty among the already poor is deepened in Prince 
Edward Island, Alberta, and slightly in Ontario, when they make an out-of-pocket prescription 
drugs expenditure. In all other provinces, individuals are brought into poverty when they fill their 
prescription drugs. Manitoba and Nova Scotia had the largest population that fell into poverty due 
to out-of-pocket prescription drug payments, and British Columbia had the least population 
proportion falling below the poverty line due to non-reimbursed drugs payments. 
This thesis, therefore, contributes to the financial risk protection literature in Canada by 
showing for the first time how out-of-pocket prescription drug payments lead to impoverishment 
and/or the deepening of poverty in Canada. The combined estimates of catastrophic and 
impoverishment from out-of-pocket prescription drug payments also showed the significant 
implication that cost sharing has for household welfare. However, this study introduces the use of 
a Partial Proportional Odds model to assess the severity of the determinants of catastrophic 
prescription drug payments across provinces and income categories. The results showed that the 
comprehensiveness and cost-sharing dynamics of an insurance program determines whether such 
programs achieve the financial protection goal. Finally, the findings from the simulation analysis 
suggest that instituting a universal coverage for drugs is not cost prohibitive and the government 
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has a more significant role to play in achieving a universal coverage for prescription drugs similar 
to Medicare in Canada.  
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured into six chapters. The objectives of this thesis were examined in 
manuscript style. Chapter One has laid the general overview, scholarly context, purpose and 
research questions. Chapter Two discusses the underpinnings of Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC) and provides the theoretical understanding/contextual framework for the study. This 
chapter also provides information on the jurisdictional power of the administration of health care 
in Canada and the resulting implication on the distribution gaps for prescription drugs program. 
Chapter Three – Manuscript 1, investigates the prevalence and intensity of catastrophic out-of-
pocket prescription drug expenditures in Canada. Here, based on published empirical literature 
review of financial risk protection, a conceptual framework showing the short run implication of 
out-of-pocket payments is made. The adjusted household budget is also explained and 
methodology for the analysis is explained in detail. Impoverishment estimates of out-of-pocket 
prescription drug payments is also presented in this chapter. Chapter Four – Manuscript 2, presents 
the determinants of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug payments. Guided by the factors 
associated with out-of-pocket prescription drug payments in Canadian literature, Multivariate 
logistic and Partial Proportional Odds regression models were specified for the variables. Visual 
appraisal of the interaction variables is also included in the chapter for a better understanding of 
the dynamics of the determinants of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drugs payments. 
Chapter Five – Manuscript 3, shows the simulation estimates of the effects of a national 
Pharmacare plan on catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug payments. This chapter analyses 
the effect on catastrophic estimates of reducing the financial burden of out-of-pocket prescription 
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drug payments on the population. Chapter Six summarises the findings of this study and presents 
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UNDERPINNINGS OF UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on explaining the theoretical foundation of Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC). Establishing the foundation of UHC is necessary for this study both as a means of 
understanding the drive towards achieving equity and the relative level of equity achieved in health 
care in Canada, which is the leading research objective of this paper. That is, the theoretical 
understanding will help establish a contextual framework for this study.  
2.2 Background 
UHC is one of the most generally shared goals in health systems around the world (Backman et 
al., 2009; Frenz & Vega, 2010; Gwatkin & Ergo, 2010; Polynin, 2015; Stuckler et al., 2010). 
Following from the various reports on UHC, the Ottawa 1986’s WHO conference on health 
promotion, the Geneva 2005’s World Health Assembly and the Beijing 2012’s Global Symposium 
on Health Systems Research, this global health goal has increasingly garnered attention in recent 
times (Beland et al., 2014; Bump, 2010; Dye, Reeder & Terry, 2013; Kelsall, Hart & Laws, 2016; 
Patcharanarumol et al., 2011; Savedoff et al., 2012). UHC seeks to capture core health standards 
and interventions such as improved access, health insurance, improved health outcomes, financial 
risk protection by the reduction of out-of-pocket payments, quality health care services, 
comprehensive health service coverage and most importantly, health equity (Dye, Reeder, & 
Terry, 2013; Mills et al., 2012; Polynin, 2015; Stuckler et al., 2010). Hence, the quintessence of 
UHC is to achieve health equity such that all individuals in a society have access to the health care 
services they need without resulting in financial difficulty or bankruptcy (Latko et al., 2010; WHO, 
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2005; WHO, 2015). 
Against this backdrop, there has been a growing interest in health equity research. This is 
because, beyond achieving efficiency, government players are also now more interested in the 
equity implications of health policies (van Doorslaer & Masseria, 2004; Wagstaff, 2011). 
Therefore, applied health equity research has become the focus of policies and programs in health 
over the past two decades (Gwatkin et al., 2005). Also, with the help of technology and an 
increased data scope, health equity research remains on the rise (Chuma & Okungu, 2011; 
Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000).  
Further, achieving equity in UHC is a function of three interconnected preconditions – 
revenue collection, financial risk pooling, and purchasing (Kutzin, 2001). This process is also 
known as the collective financial risk pooling mechanism and cross-subsidization, and politics are 
inevitably involved (Mathauer, 2015; Prinja, Kaur & Kumar, 2012). In other words, the equity 
hypothesis of UHC implies that all individuals regardless of their peculiarities, e.g. financial, 
religious, ethnic, or social class etc. obtain based on needs the benefits of the aggregation and 
administration of revenue from the collective financial risk pooling mechanism (Garret, 
Chowdhury & Pablos-Mendez, 2009; Gwatkin & Ergo, 2011).  
As documented above, the focus of this study is on Canada’s programs on prescription drugs 
because of this unique reality of Canada’s health system among other developed countries that 
have made progress towards UHC (Morgan & Boothe, 2016). Again, Canada’s health system does 
not include universal coverage of prescription drugs (Clemens & Esmail, 2012; Gamble & Deber, 
2004; Giacomini, 2005; Marchildon, 2014). The effects of the absence of universal coverage for 
prescription drugs in Canada is evident concerning the disparities in access, individuals’ financial 
burden, as well as overall health system costs (Morgan et al., 2015). Also, the disparities which 
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largely depend on factors such as residents' province of residence, income, workplace etc. are 
documented to restrict residents' ability to get prescription drugs based on medical needs (Gupta 
et al., 2018). The disparities ultimately lead to inequities in the health care system in Canada and 
a precise antithesis to the equity hypothesis of UHC (Boothe, 2012; Holmes, 2012; O’Brady, 
Gagnon & Cassels, 2015). A comprehensive review of the dynamics of the effect of disparities in 
health service access and utilization on UHC equity can be found in Frenz & Vega (2010). 
2.3 The Ideological Underpinnings of UHC 
Following from the previous section, it is essential to understand the theoretical underpinnings of 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) (Kutzin, 2013; Starfield & Shi, 2002). The World Health 
Organizations’ 2010 World Health Report explains this concept in a diagram that is reproduced 
below (WHO, 2010).  












In the cubic representation of UHC above, the WHO captures UHC as a system that aims to 
improve 1). The range of services provided 2). Advance coverage of the total population and 3). 
Makes progress toward an increased share of pooled funding in the total funding for health care to 
reduce cost-sharing, deductibles, and fees (Bhasin & Bhardwaj, 2018; Klazienga, 2010; Ranjan, 
2017). Each component of the cube is weaved with equity concerns, e.g. should health care be 
regarded as a fundamental human right? How much should individuals pay for health services, and 
how should such payments be prorated? Who should oversee health care management - the public 
or the private sector or both? What criteria should guide the types of services covered? When can 
health care services be regarded as needed, and who should benefit from the service?  (Frenk & 
De Ferranti, 2012; Frenz & Vega, 2003; Polynin, 2015; Ranjan, 2017). 
 The volume of the cube represents the varying level of progress a country makes towards 
achieving UHC and equity (Ranjan, 2017; WHO, 2013).  The higher the volume of the cube filled, 
the better the country does on the UHC index. For example, when a country makes progress 
towards financial risk protection of its population by the reduction of out-of-pocket health 
expenditure at the point of service delivery, the spiral effect of financial catastrophe, 
impoverishment, and poor health outcome is significantly reduced (Lagomarsino et al., 2012; 
Ranjan, 2017; Xu et al., 2003). But no country has successfully entirely filled the cube because of 
constraints such as legal, financial, political/power, institutional, human and social capital, vested 
interest groups etc. (Bhasin & Bhardwaj, 2018; Bobadila, 1998; Mills, 2010; Polynin, 2015; 
Savedof et al., 2012; Stuckler et al., 2010). It is important to note that political constraint is the 
most crucial factor that determines the conception and trajectory of UHC in a country (Sengupta, 
2013). These constraints are deeply embedded in the historical explanations for why Pharmacare 
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was not included in Canada’s publicly financed health insurance system (Medicare) and are 
explained in chapter five of this thesis. 
In the ideal UHC system, of importance is the dichotomy between the government as the 
health provider and the patient as the buyer of services, and this is a signet of reforms in 
government establishments in general (Allotey et al., 2012). That is, the dichotomy between the 
service provider and the service receiver is apparent (Sengupta, 2013). Advocates of the UHC 
model highlight that the state has a role to play in ensuring the sustainable, equitable, as well as 
accountable financing of health care, in addition to functioning governance and organization of 
health service provision (Laurell, 2007; Ranjan, 2017; Sengupta, 2013). The state’s role is to 
ameliorate the negative consequences of a purely private provision of health service that results 
from negative externalities as well as market failure. For example, because of the price tag to 
services as well as strong profit motives in a purely private market, overpricing of health services 
that lead to catastrophic and impoverishing payments might occur (Ranjan, 2017; Sengupta, 2013).  
Also, a weak, purely public provisioning of health services can result in catastrophic and 
impoverishing health payments, hence the need for a mix of both the public and private markets 
(Sengupta, 2013). 
Despite the many criticisms against this model, it has, on several occasions, been 
successfully defended by its chief proponents (Bump, 2015; Reid, 2017; WHO, 2013). Among the 
drawbacks of the cube, however, is the fact that it obscures the specificity of the substantial 
disparities in coverage across population segments and broad categories in terms of national 
averages (Roberts, Hsiao & Reich, 2015). That is, it fails to explain what groups experience what 
coverage, and services. Another limitation is that trade-offs of benefits of service users are not 
explicitly defined (WHO, 2014).  The cube also fails to show how changes in any of its dimensions 
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lead to desired health outcomes (Roberts, Hsiao & Reich, 2015). For an overview of the multi-
country dynamics of Universal Health Coverage, see Sengupta (2013). 
2.4 Canada’s Prescription Drugs Program Gap and Distribution  
According to the Canada Health Act6 (CHA), the federal government provides, maintains, 
administers, and delivers health care to a subgroup of the Canadian population (i.e. indigenous 
people, veterans, refugees, and prison inmates), while provincial and territorial governments are 
responsible for the other Canadian population groups (Government of Canada, 1984; Phillips, 
2016). The CHA legislated the elimination of extra-billing and user fees for hospital services, 
physician services, and prescription drugs administered in the hospital setting (inpatient 
prescription drugs). Hence, programs for prescription drugs used outside of the hospital (outpatient 
prescription drugs) in Canada are designed entirely differently from the provisions of the CHA. 
Outpatient prescription drugs program in Canada are designed by provinces and are based on 
factors such as financing mechanism, targeted population, and the specific prescription drugs 
covered (formulary) (Phillips, 2016).  
Specifically, provincial prescription drug programs are subdivided into several plans as low 
as one in number in Quebec and as high as 28 in Prince Edward Island (Phillips, 2016). The 
programs use a targeted design – either specific illness or population subgrouping - to ensure 
coverage (Marchildon, 2004). In all provinces, it is observed that unlike obtainable with seniors 
and the general population aged under 65, social assistance recipients do not pay any premiums. 
 
6 It is important to note that the provision of CHA in general health care in Canada is not without limitation. The 
federal government of Canada sets the health regulations and makes cash transfers to provinces and territories based 
on the principles of universality, portability, comprehensiveness, public administration, and accessibility. 
Notwithstanding, the delivery of health care is still largely under the jurisdictional powers of the provinces and 
territories and enforcement of the principles have not been as strict as expected. This decentralization in provision and 
delivery leads to varying leads of equity achieve in health care in the country (Allin, 2008; Martin et al., 2018). 
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Hence, the general population and seniors are hardest hit by the financial burden of prescription 
drug payments in the form of significant deductibles, premiums, and copayments (Boychuk & 
Banting, 2008). As shown in Table 2.1 below, most provinces also use income-based metric for 
coverage, and this negatively affects equity and cost adherence in general since the burden of 
payment rests on individuals rather than a pooled pre-payment mechanism. Still, provincial 
governments offer some form of coverage, particularly for individuals who experience high costs 
of prescription drugs relative to their income using a deductible cap. The specificity of this for the 
years 2018/2019 is given in table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1: Provincial variation in deductible cap for catastrophic prescription drugs coverage 
 





• Net income level 
• Prescription drug costs 
• 5% of net income for those 
earning below $40,000 
• 7.5% of net income for those 
earning between $40,000 and 
$75,000 
• 10% of net income for those 
earning between $75,000 an 
$150,000 
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND (PEI) • Catastrophic 
drug 
program 
• Household annual 
income 
• 3% of household annual 
income up to $20,000 
• 5% of household annual 
income if between $20,000 to 
$50,000 
• 8% of household annual 
income if between $50,000 to 
$100,000 
• 12% of household annual 
income greater than 
$100,000 
 
MANITOBA (MB) • Pharmacare 
program 
• Adjusted family income 
(accounts for spousal 
income and dependents) 
• 3% of adjusted family income 
up to $15,000 
• 6.98% of adjusted family 
income from $75,001 and 
greater 
 
NOVA SCOTIA (NS) • Family 
Pharmacare 
program 
• Family size 
• Annual Income 
• No fixed value. Maximum 
annual deductible varies with 
criteria  
ONTARIO (ON) • Trillium 
drug 
program 
• After-tax household 
income 
• 3% to 4% of household after 
tax income. In addition to 
paying up to $2 per person 
per prescription filled or 
refilled 
SASKATCHEWAN (SK) • Special 
support 
program 
• Adjusted total family 
income (accounts for 
number of dependents) 




BRITISH COLUMBIA (BC) • Fair 
Pharmacare 
• Family net income • No deductible or family 
maximum for those earning 
less than $13,750 
• No deductible for those 
earning between $13,750 and 
$30,000 but varying family 
maximum 
• Varying percentage range of 
family net income. Lowest 
range is 2.92% of family net 
income for $30,001 to 
$31,667 
• 4% for family net income of 
$70,833.01 to 79,167.00 
 





• Net family income • $19.90 monthly deductible  
• Cap - $90.58 monthly 
• Cap - $1087 yearly 
ALBERTA (AB) • Non-group 
coverage 
• Residency • No existing deductible but 
upper limit of $25 per 
prescription 
NEW BRUNSWICK (NB) • New 
Brunswick 
drug plan 
• Annual family income • No documented deductibles 
 
See Appendix 2.6 for detailed references 
 
Notwithstanding, evidence-based research continues to show that despite provincial efforts 
towards reducing the prevalence of catastrophic drug expenditures, there exist disparities and 
equity concerns in the country. First, the financing mechanism employed, which relies heavily on 
copayments, premiums and deductibles imply that a certain proportion of Canadians are still 
underinsured (Kapur & Basu, 2005; Caldbick et al., 2015). Further, the jurisdictional power of 
each province allows for disparities in the formulary used across the country, and there exists no 
uniform standard national formulary for prescription drugs (Phillips, 2016). Lastly, the continuous 
experience of pharmaceutical innovations increasingly drives up costs of drugs coupled with the 
fact that Canada is an ageing population, and provincial governments are under pressure to find 
cost-effective means of sustaining the programs (Health Council of Canada, 2009). As noted in 
chapter one, catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures are not invariably correlated with high 
health care payments and are not predictable; hence, such payments may be a significant cause of 
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household poverty. There is, therefore, the need to understand the level of equity achieved 
concerning prescription drugs using the UHC cube in the face of constraints such as ageing 
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF CATASTROPHIC AND IMPOVERISHING 
OUT-OF-POCKET PRESCRIPTION DRUG PAYMENTS IN CANADA 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents the prevalence and intensity of financial catastrophe from out-of-pocket 
prescription drug expenditures in Canada. This chapter used a new to Canadian data budget share 
approach to determine the distribution of financial risks from such payments.  Further, indices to 
determine which households overshot their budget shares were constructed. This chapter 
concludes by presenting the impoverishment estimates as well as the effect on income distribution. 
3.2 Out-of-pocket Healthcare Payments and Financial Protection 
The strong and regressive effect of out-of-pocket health care payment on household financial 
catastrophe and impoverishment is well documented in literature (Brearley, Marten & O’Connell, 
2013; Kimani, 2014; Leive & Xu, 2008; Ngcamphalala & Ataguba, 2018; Wagstaff & Van 
Doorslaer, 2003; WHO, 2010; Yardim, Cilingiroglu & Yardim, 2010). In other words, although 
most health care systems in the world  have either a public or private health insurance system, the 
presence of out-of-pocket payment reduces financial protection and has potential to unsettle 
households’ living standards, productivity and welfare in general (Baeza & Packard, 2005; Tomini, 
Packard, & Tomini, 2013; WHO, 2010). Hence, as one of the six building blocks of a health 
system, the importance of health system financing cannot be overemphasized (Hort et al., 2010; 
WHO, 2007). Health system financing is a policy instrument that shapes the achievement of the 
health systems’ goals of financial risk protection and good health outcomes (Ngcamphalala & 
Ataguba, 2016; WHO, 2007; WHO, 2010). As the global drive towards UHC continues, the 
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assessment of a health systems’ financial protection level is, therefore, necessary for the 
formulation of targeted policies to ensure that residents are protected from financial catastrophe 
and impoverishment. 
As noted in chapter one, out-of-pocket health expenditures are termed “catastrophic” if they 
result in significant reduction in standards of living for the households either in the short or long 
run (Kawabata, Xu & Carrin, 2002; Stiglitz, 1988; Van Doorslaer et al., 2006; Wagstaff & Van 
Doorslaer, 2002). That is, if out-of-pocket health expenditure as against total expenditure in a given 
household (this ratio is also known as a budget share) exceeds a given threshold such that living 
standards are disrupted, it is catastrophic for the household (Caldbick et al., 2015; McLeod et al., 
2011). It is important to note that, the financial burden households experience as a result of 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments is crucial and has significant implications for policy 
(Elgazzara et al., 2010; Kimani, 2014; Whitehead, Dahlgren & Evans, 2001; WHO, 2005). First, 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures are not invariably correlated with high health care 
payments (Su, Kouyate & Flessa, 2006; Wyszewianski, 1986; Xu et al., 2003), and are not 
predictable (Akazili et al., 2017; Arrow, 1963;  Kimani, 2014; Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 
2015), hence, such payments may be a significant cause of household poverty. Payments may also 
cause households to divert their limited household resources to other household necessities such 
as food, shelter etc. or even sell their assets/borrow to finance such health care payments (Berki, 
1986; Foster, 1994; Löfgren, 2014; O’Donnell et al., 2008; Russell 2004; World Bank, 1993; Yip 
& Hsiao, 2009). Also, households may forgo seeking treatment altogether, thereby resulting in 
private costs from health complications, and social costs on the health system (Baeza & Packard, 
2005; Gertler & Gruber, 2002; Kesselheim et al., 2015; Law, Kratzer, & Dhalla, 2014; Sanmartin 
et al., 2014; WHO 2010).  
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Since most scholarly works done in the health financing equity field have focused on 
developing countries, little is known about the distribution of financial catastrophe and 
impoverishment residents of developed countries face. For example, in Canada, the distribution 
and intensity of the financial burden from out-of-pocket payments for prescription drugs have been 
a subject of much debate, but not much empirical work has been done in this regard. Public 
prescription drugs programs in Canada, are financed by individual provinces (also known as the 
Canadian “patchwork” of prescription drugs program) (Daw & Morgan, 2012; Kapur & Basu, 
2005; Gagnon, 2014; Morgan, Daw & Law, 2013). These prescription drugs programs vary 
between provinces regarding who has coverage and what types of prescription drugs are covered 
(Anis, Guh & Wang, 2001; Barnes & Andersen, 2015; Demers et al., 2008). As shown in table 2.1 
of this thesis, individual provinces use different eligibility criteria and deductible caps to fund 
catastrophic spending; this significantly diminishes health equity. As a result of the “patchwork” 
prescription drug programs, some Canadian residents must pay out-of-pocket to fill their 
prescription drugs (Caldbick et al., 2015; Morgan et al., 2015). It is estimated that around 67 
percent of households are exposed to out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures (Law et al., 
2012). In total, Canadians paid approximately $6.5 billion as out-of-pocket payment in filling their 
prescriptions in 2014 (Law et al., 2018). A lack of universal prescription drug coverage, therefore, 
implies some Canadians are not able to afford the needed prescription drugs (Barnes & Andersen, 
2015). The problem of access to prescription drugs affects at least 23 percent of Canadian 
households (Angus Reid Institute, 2015). According to Kennedy & Morgan (2006), five to ten 
percent of Canadians cannot fill their prescription drugs due to cost and one in twelve Canadians 
who are 55 years of age and above still suffer from cost-related non-adherence. Another study 
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found that one in ten Canadians cannot fill their prescription drugs due to the prohibitive cost 
associated with paying from out-of-pocket (Law et al., 2012). 
Despite the results of these studies and the alarming figures they present, little analysis has 
been conducted into the measurement of financial protection Canadians experience in the existing 
patchwork drug benefit system. Estimating the distribution of the financial burden experienced by 
Canadian households because of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures is, therefore, the 
first step towards addressing the policy issue (Merlis, 2003; Xu et al., 2003). 
 
3.3  Review of Empirical Studies 
3.3.1 Literature Review 
When health payments exceed a particular share of total household expenditure, such payments 
are called catastrophic (Pradhan & Prescott, 2002; Xu et al., 2003). Although the choice of the 
threshold is value-laden, a 10 percent threshold is predominantly favoured in the literature 
(Ranson, 2002; Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 2003). Scholars document that this threshold 
represents the point at which households are forced to forgo basic needs, incur debt or become 
poor (Russell, 2004). Conversely, Kawabata et al., (2002), WHO (2005) and Xu et al. (2003) 
proposed the use of “capacity to pay” at a threshold of 40 percent. The capacity to pay is defined 
as a household’s income less subsistence spending. 
Xu et al. (2003) used cross-sectional data from 59 countries to analyze the distribution of 
catastrophic health payments. The scholars documented that households incurring catastrophic 
health payments were as low as 0.01 percent in France, 0.1 percent in Costa Rica and as high as 
10.3 percent in Brazil and 10.45 in Vietnam. A similar study was carried out for 11 Asian countries. 
The results of the analysis showed, countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia had a low 
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prevalence of catastrophic spending when compared to countries such as Bangladesh, Vietnam 
and India (Van Doorslaer et al., 2006). About 20 percent of households finance their health care 
from borrowing and a similar percentage experience cost-related non-adherence in Georgia 
(Skarbinski, 2002). A similar result is documented for Mexico, where the poor must sometimes 
forgo treatments due to the cost of health care (Frenk, Lozano & Gonz´alez-Block, 1994). 
Analogous research for Latin American countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and the 
Dominican Republic are also well documented in the Pan American Health Organization (2004). 
Furthermore, several studies have shown that in certain countries, the rich (households in the 
highest income quartile) spend a lower share of their budget on out-of-pocket health spending 
(Hotchikss et al., 1998). For instance, in Thailand, the poor were found to have a higher budget 
share than the rich (Pannarunothai & Mills, 1997). It is also imperative to note that in countries 
with high dependence on private insurance and out-of-pocket payments, the rich are favoured in 
the health financing scheme (Merlis, 2003; Wagstaff et al., 1999). An example of this is the case 
of prescription drug payment in Canada. 
 In this regard, two Canadian studies have used nationally representative survey data sets – 
the 2006 and 2009 SHS to estimate the financial burden for households from out-of-pocket 
prescription drug payments (Caldbick et al., 2015; McLeod et al., 2011). Both studies used the 
budget share methodology advanced by Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer (2003). In their work, Caldbick 
et al., 2015 analyzed the distribution of financial burden by province, age, income, gender, and 
education. The results showed that education and income had a negative relationship with the 
financial burden, while gender showed no significant variation. However, as much as 1.1% of 
Canadians experienced catastrophic payments at a 9% threshold and 8.2% of Canadians at a 3% 
threshold. The study also documented significant interprovincial variations in catastrophic burdens 
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due to the existing patchwork system. An earlier study by McLeod et al., (2011) analyzed the 
provincial variation of financial burden using the distribution of insurance coverage – general 
population, social assistance recipients, and senior households. Using a bell curve, the study 
concentrated on the distribution of households at the median and 95th percentile. The results 
showed that there existed little variation among provinces and, generally, a low financial burden 
as well as catastrophic expenditure for Canadian households. As documented earlier, the budget 
share approach does not differentiate among households with regards to their expenditure on 
necessities, and this implies that all households have equal weight in the estimation of the financial 
burden. Hence, for this study, Xu et al., (2003’s) capacity to pay approach will be used. The 
approach is explained in the next section. 
Further, while models used to assess catastrophic payments are insightful, they fail to explain 
the impact of such payments on households with respect to poverty (Goudge et al., 2009). Hence, 
it remains important to explain the impoverishment resulting from out-of-pocket payments. This 
is because depending on household’s income, a low out-of-pocket payment does not necessarily 
mean the absence of impoverishing payments. In this regard, the use of poverty line has been 
advanced. A poverty line is defined as the estimated minimum level of income needed to secure 
the necessities of life (O’Donnell et al., 2008). A household’s total expenditure less of out-of-
pocket payments is then evaluated against a given fixed poverty line (Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 
2003).  The main idea behind the model is the Grossman-Wagstaff theory of demand for health. 
The theory states that health care costs are represented by the opportunity cost of a household’s 
consumption when purchasing health care (Grossman, 1999). Also, according to the theory, health 
care is a derived demand, which is demanded first as a commodity to be consumed for utility as 
well as an investment for healthy days (Kimani, 2014).  Although the use of poverty indices has 
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been criticized for not incorporating indirect costs of out-of-pocket payments, the model continues 
to be favoured mainly in the field of health equity research (Ngcamphalala, 2016; Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 2003). It is imperative to note that no study has examined the impoverishment effect of 




3.3.2 Conceptual Framework 
At a given level of household income in the short run, the diagram below shows the effect of a 
health uncertainty (defined as an episode of illness and payment for prescription drugs in this 
thesis) on that household. The diagram shows the step by step potential household implications 
using a wide range of health payment mechanisms and their associated spectrum of coverage. 
Hence, a conceptual framework for this study is drawn below. 
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3.4 Study Methods and Data 
3.4.1 The Data  
Statistics Canada’s 2016 Survey of Household Spending (SHS) was used for this study. The SHS 
is a two-staged sampling design that covers the ten provinces of Canada. The sample consists of 
17 590 households. The response rate was 65.5 percent. The territories of Canada were not included 
in this analysis because the proportion of their population is small, and several federal programs 
cover the population.  
The 2016 data used was the annualized household level SHS. The data is weighted to 
represent the total population. For SHS’s weights and methodology, please refer to the website 
provided in the reference section (Statistics Canada, 2017).  
3.4.2 Method 
3.4.2.1 Household Budget – a definition 
To measure catastrophic payments, a budget share of out-of-pocket drug expenditure in the 
household resource is usually constructed (O’Donnell et al., 2008). The idea behind the budget 
share method is that spending a large portion of the household’s resources on health care must be 
at an opportunity cost of consuming other goods and services. Two variables are important to 
construct the budget share. The variables are household’s out-of-pocket payments for prescription 
drugs (numerator) and a measure of household resources (denominator) (Xu et al., 2003). To 
measure household resources, three approaches exist income, expenditure, and consumption (Berki 
et al., 1986; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). If income is used as a denominator in the share 
above, the opportunity cost of prescription drug expenditures is directly evident on consumption 
and expenditure of other goods and services and not directly on income. This use of income as a 
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denominator is considered an advantage because the source of a household’s income is most times 
fixed and predictable, unlike consumption or expenditure patterns (O’Donnell et al., 2008). That 
is, due to the predictability and stability of incomes in general over time, the effect of health 
expenditure is quickly evident on the budget share.  
However, depending on whether prescription drug expenditures are financed by current 
income or saved income over time, the opportunity cost of prescription drug expenditures on 
household resources may be experienced in the short term or long term, respectively. This disparity 
in the long run or short-run effects is not easily captured in household surveys. In other words, the 
stability of income ignores whether that income is just only the household’s current income or 
current income plus savings or credit facility. The later household has more coping strategies than 
the former, and this is overlooked in the survey design. Also, most survey respondents have been 
noted to significantly underreport their income for tax evasion reasons (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 
2003). Hence, in literature, income as a denominator is generally not explored (Kimani, 2014).  
Given these limitations, consumption or expenditure is preferred and used as the denominator 
of the budget share. When a household’s total expenditure is used as the denominator, catastrophic 
expenditure is defined based on the budget share of health payments in total household expenditure 
(O’Donnell et al., 2008). The problem with this approach is that budget share may be low for poor 
households because a more substantial portion of household resources is taken up by expenditures 
on food and essential items, leaving a small fraction of resources to spend on health care. In other 
words, this approach excludes households that cannot afford to meet their catastrophic health 
payments in the first instance (Kimani, 2014).  
An improvement to this methodology is the proposed method for this study. This study 
extends the literature and uses the household’s “capacity to pay,” also known as “non-discretionary 
expenditure,” instead of household income or expenditure as the denominator of the budget share 
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(Xu et al., 2003). A household’s “capacity to pay” is defined as the effective income left for the 
household after meeting subsistence needs (Buigut, Ettarh & Amenda, 2015). Subsistence 
expenditure is given as food expenditure and other non-food expenditures that are categorized as 
necessities and adjusted for equivalent household sizes (Pal, 2012). The argument is that non-food 
expenditure better differentiates between the rich and the poor than total expenditure (O’Donnell 
et al., 2008). This approach indicates that out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditure in Canada is 
involuntary and harms household’s welfare due to the opportunity costs of payments made on 
prescription drugs (Akinkugbe, Chama-Chiliba & Tlotlego, 2012). The resulting budget share is 
thus given by out-of-pocket drug payments as a ratio of non-subsistence household expenditure. 
For this study, household expenditure is given by all outlays towards all goods and services 
less outlay on vehicle and recreational vehicles (Caldbick et al., 2015; McLeod et al., 2011). Food 
expenditure by household is the value spent on all foodstuff both produced within or outside the 
household. Food expenditure does not include expenditure on alcohol, beverages or take-outs from 
restaurants or hotels (Xu et al., 2003). 
 
3.4.2.2 Data Analysis 
The study used Stata v15 software for all the analysis in this chapter. The 2016 data used was the 
annualized household level SHS and weighted accordingly with the survey weights to show the 
total population estimates. As earlier discussed in section 3.4.2.1, the household capacity to pay 
was used in the budget share equation. Following how the thresholds presented in the National 
Pharmaceutical Strategy report of 2006 were derived, this study used the updated thresholds of the 
existing provincial income-based drug plans (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, 
Ontario, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia). The 2006 report used as thresholds, the minimum, 
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average, and maximum values of the deductible caps of the then existing income-based public drug 
programs that determined catastrophic expenditure. The values of the current deductible caps can 
be found in table 2.1 of chapter two. Hence, this study presents the results of catastrophic 
expenditures using the lower limit, average and upper limit of the maximum income threshold 
percentages (3.4%, 6.73% and 12%) (Health Canada, 2006). 
Also, for the first time in Canada, this study identified individuals who are “working poor”7 
according to the country’s newly instituted official poverty line and presented the prevalence of 
Catastrophic Out-of-pocket Prescription drug expenditures (COOPDE) among them. As suggested 
by Arsenijevic, Pavlova and Groot (2013), the working poor are those whose income is between 
the absolute poverty line and the relative poverty line value. In Canada, the official absolute poverty 
line is approximately $37,500 for a family of four (consisting of two children and two adults). 
3.4.2.3 Determining Catastrophic Out-of-Pocket Prescription Drug 
Expenditure Using Capacity to Pay Approach 
 
Mathematically, using Canadian data, the budget share was derived by following the steps below: 
Step 1: Derivation of the out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditure of each household 
(OOPDEh). Out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in this study are the actual amount paid 
by a household after receiving reimbursement from insurance plans. OOPDE = total drug payment 
from a household – insurance coverage. Transportation costs incurred when filling prescription 
drugs are also not included in this analysis because the data is not available in the survey. 
Additionally, the loss in productivity because of not filling prescription drugs was excluded 
 
7 It is important to note here that, the definition of the “working poor” in this thesis is based on income categorization 
and not necessarily the same as typically defined in Canada. This definition is motivated by empirical literature of 




because it measures the effect of illness resulting from not filling prescription drugs rather than the 
financial catastrophe of filling prescription drugs (Xu et al., 2007).  
Step 2: Derivation of the poverty line. The poverty line – the per capita (equivalent) subsistence 
expenditure – is the average of the equivalent food expenditures of the households whose food 
shares fall between the 45th and 55th percentiles of the food shares of all the households in the 
sample (Lara & Gomez, 2011; Xu et al., 2004). The poverty line figure will be used to derive the 
subsistence expenditure for all households in the next step. The procedure of finding the poverty 
line of the households in the sample consists of three steps.  
First, calculate the food share of households (FoodShareh) and rank the food shares in ascending 
order. A household’s food share is the share of its food expenditure in total household expenditure 
(FoodShareh) and is given by the expression: 
FoodShareh = 
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝑇𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ)
                                                        (3.1) 
Second, find the equivalent food expenditure (FoodExp_Eqh) of all households that adjusts for the 
equivalent household size.  
FoodExp_Eqh = 
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ)
 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝐸𝑞𝐻𝐻𝑆ℎ)
                                                      (3.2)                                      
where equivalent household size (EqHHSh) is captured in the expression: 
EqHHSh = [HHSh]0.56                                                                                                                                                                 (3.3) 
Equivalent household size adjusts the household size by an equivalent scale. The value of the 
parameter β has been estimated from previous studies based on 59 countries’ household survey 
data, and it equals 0.56 (Deaton & Zaidi, 2002; Xu, 2004). The value of β being 0.56 implies that 
an increase in the household’s number by one increases the household’s consumption by less than 
proportional value. The motivation behind this is that there is a need for a comparable basis for all 
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households in the study. For example, because of economies of scale (appropriate savings in foods 
because of one additional member’s consumption), a household of six members do not necessarily 
require six times the level of food expenditure for one member. In other words, a simple division 
of household’s expenditure by the number of individuals in the household does not yield overall 
comparable results. Finally, calculate the poverty line as the average of the equivalent food 
expenditures of those households whose food shares fall within the 45th to 55th percentile of 
FoodShare.   
PovertyLine = Average (FoodExp_Eqh)                                                                  (3.4) 
if FoodShare_45thpercentile < FoodShareh < FoodShare_55thpercentile 
Step 3: Derivation of each household’s subsistence expenditure (SubExph). Subsistence 
expenditure is equal to the product of the poverty line and the equivalent household size of each 
household (EqHHSh), and is given by the expression:  
SubExph = PovertyLine * EqHHSh                                                                              (3.5)                                                                                       
Step 4: A household’s capacity to pay (Capacityh) is then equal to the following: 
Capacityh = {
𝑇𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ − 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ,  𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ ≤ 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ
𝑇𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ, 𝑖𝑓  𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ >  𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ       (3.6) 
This proposed study defines the “capacity to pay” of a household as the “non-subsistence 
expenditures,” i.e. the total household expenditure net of the calculated subsistence expenditure. 
However, when a household’s total expenditure is lower than the estimated subsistence 
expenditure, “capacity to pay” will be taken as the observed “non-food expenditure” (Kimani 2014; 
Lara & Gomez, 2011; Xu et al., 2004).  




𝑂𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐷𝐸ℎ)
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑’𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑎𝑦 (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦ℎ) 
                (3.7) 
Step 6: Determine whether a household has catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug 
expenditure. The event of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures (COOPDEh) 
occurs when the adjusted budget share is greater than 12 percent. 
𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐷𝐸ℎ = {
1 , BudgetShareh ≥ 12%
0, BudgetShareh <  12%
                                                               (3.8) 
This study also determined catastrophic events at the 3.4 percent and 6.73 percent thresholds and 
compare the results.   
3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Prevalence of Catastrophic Expenditures 
The dollar amount of the OOPDE shown in table 3.6 in the Appendix indicates that as high as 
63.21% of Canadian households had to pay greater than $0 when they fill their prescription drugs. 
Across provinces, Prince Edward Island (74.7%), Quebec (74.4%) and Newfoundland (71.52%) 
had the highest percentage of non-zero OOPDE among their populations.  Further, the working 
poor, seniors, and those whose education was below high school had the highest average dollar 
amount of out-of-pocket payment. 
The prevalence of COOPDE at the thresholds 3.4%, 6.73% and 12% using the capacity to 
pay approach is presented in table 3.1 below. For Canada, at 3.4%, 6.73% and 12%, the prevalence 
of COOPDE are 14.61%, 6.12% and 1.88% respectively. That is using a 6.73% threshold, 6.12% 
of Canadian households incurred catastrophic payments when they fill their prescription drugs. The 
prevalence of COOPDE is highest among the working poor (27.22%, 12.07%, and 3.23%) among 
the income groups. Across provinces, the burden is highest in Quebec, Prince Edward Island, 
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Manitoba, and Saskatchewan compared to the other provinces. The results also show an inverse 
relationship between educational level and prevalence of COOPDE. Specifically, across all 
thresholds, individuals with education greater than or equal to university level experienced a 
relatively lower burden of COOPDE compared to other education levels (below high school, high 
school, between high school and university). The prevalence of COOPDE is very similar between 
different gender groups. Like education, individuals who are seniors (31.89%, 14.19%, 4.16%) are 
more likely to experience COOPDE compared to other age groups. A more detailed description is 
given in the table 3.1 below. A visual appraisal of the provincial distribution is also given in Figure 
3.5 of the appendix. 
                                                    
Table 2.1: Distribution of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in 
Canada, 2016 at 3.4, 6.73 and 12%. 
  
                            Budget share thresholds 
Variables 3.4% 6.73% 12% 
    
Canada 14.61 6.12 1.88 
    
Age (years)    
< 35  5.76 2.07 0.77 
35-50  5.80 1.54 0.51 
50-65 13.64 6.03 1.88 
≥65 31.89 14.19 4.16 
    
Gender    
Male 14.10 6.49 2.22 
Female 15.09 5.78 1.56 
    
Per capita PL income    
>Ave 7.61 2.95 0.94 
RPL-AVE 17.82 7.29 2.21 
ABL-RPL 27.22 12.07 3.23 
BAPL 11.97 5.77 2.31 
    
Education    
Below high school 29.88 13.38 4.44 
High school 15.22 6.91 1.64 
Between 13.98 5.36 1.77 
≥ University 7.53 2.87 0.94 
    
Provinces    
NL 16.70 7.42 3.55 
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PEI 18.58 10.19 4.67 
NS 15.95 6.87 2.28 
NB 18.36 7.40 2.39 
PQ 23.72 9.82 2.26 
ONT 9.50 4.06 1.43 
MB 17.28 8.96 3.59 
SK 17.36 8.31 3.31 
AB 9.67 3.92 1.75 
BC 13.24 4.87 1.29 
    
Employment income     
Paid/self/investment 
income 




26.49 11.63 3.55 
    
Marital status    
Separated/divorced/never 
married) 
13.03 5.14 1.43 
Married/common-
law/widowed 
15.39 6.61 2.09 
*BAPL - Below absolute poverty line * ABL-RPL – Working poor * RPL-Ave – Between 
relatively poor and average per capita income * >Ave – Greater than average per capita income 
 
 
3.5.2 Intensity of catastrophic Payments  
 
Recall that budget share is given as the ratio of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures to 
household’s capacity to pay. And catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures is 
equal to 1 if the budget share is equal to or exceeds a threshold and 0 if otherwise. Let the “ith” 
household’s out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures be Ti and the household’s capacity to pay 
be CPTPi. Let the threshold be given as z.  
Therefore, we can define an indicator say 𝐸, where 𝐸 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑖/𝐶𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑖 ≥  𝑧 and 𝐸 =
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑖/𝐶𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑖 < z. The resulting estimation of the catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug 
expenditures, also known as the prevalence and Headcount index (H), is presented in the previous 




∑ E𝑛𝑖=1 i                     (3.10) 
56 
 
Where N is the size of the survey sample, the headcount index, as the name connotes, is the 
count of the occurrence of catastrophic spending and does little to explain the intensity of 




∑ 𝑇𝑖/𝐶𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑖 ⎼ 𝑧 𝑛𝑖=1            (3.11) 
The Overshoot index Oi is calculated as the difference between the actual budget share 
percentage that a household experience and the threshold of interest. For example, if a household’s 
budget share is 25 percent and the threshold of interest is at 10 percent, the overshoot for that 
household is given by the difference between 25 and 10, which is equal to 15 percent. However, 
for those households whose budget share is lower than 10 percent, their overshoot is recorded as 
zero. In this case, “N” in equation 3.11 encompasses both those who incurred and those who did 
not incur catastrophic spending. 
Another index, Mean Positive Overshoot (MPO), measures the overshoot among only those 




             (3.12) 
For example, assume we have four household observations where three of those households 
experience catastrophic spending at a 10 percent threshold. If their budget share is given as 10, 15, 
25, 35 percent. Then the prevalence is 75 percent, overshoot is 11.25 percent while the MPO is 15 
percent. 
3.6 Measuring the Distribution Sensitivity of Catastrophic Out-of-Pocket 
Prescription drug expenditures 
 
 Aside from assessing the occurrence and prevalence of catastrophic payments, it is imperative also 
to assess the dynamics of the households that experience catastrophic payment. That is, a question 
such as do the poor tend to overshoot their budget share threshold compared to the rich is very 
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important to targeted policy formulation (O’Donnell et al., 2008). Against this backdrop, there is 
the need to develop weighted and distribution sensitive indices, also known in the literature as a 
concentration index. That is concentration indices for both overshoot (Co) and prevalence index 
(CE) such that for both indices, a positive value implies that wealthier households tend to exceed 
the budget share threshold while a negative value suggests that poorer households tend to exceed 
the budget share threshold. According to O’Donnell et al., (2008), the rank weighted headcount 
and overshoot are then given by the following expressions: 
                                                      Hrw=H. (1-CE)     (3.13) 
Orw=O. (1-CO)     (3.14) 
From the expressions above, if CE takes on a negative value, the implication is that H
rw > H 
and households with lower capacity to pay tend to exceed the budget share threshold. The opposite 
occurs when CE takes on a positive value. A similar submission holds for the rank weighted 
overshoot expression. 
3.6.1 Results of the Intensity and Distribution Sensitivity of COOPDE 
The tables 3.2 and 3.3 below show both the prevalence, intensity, and distribution sensitivity of 
catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drugs payment in Canada from the 2016 Survey of 
Household Spending. The methodology employed was Xu et al., (2003)’s capacity to pay approach. 
The table 3.2 shows that the prevalence of COOPDE falls from 14.61% to 1.88% and the overshoot 
falls from 0.64% to 0.13% as the threshold was raised from 3.4% to 12%. At the 3.4% threshold, 
the overshoot among those who already incurred COOPDE measured as the MPO, imply that 
households spent an average of 7.77% (3.4%+4.37%) and 19.14% (12%+7.14%) at the 12% 
threshold on prescription drugs.  
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Also, the weighted headcount index 19.99%, 9.02% and 2.91% is higher than the initial 
headcount index 14.61%, 6.12% and 1.88% at all the three thresholds. This phenomenon means 
that poorer households in Canada incur more catastrophic payments compared to wealthier 
households. The negative values of the concentration indices also confirm this (-0.37, -0.47 and -
0.55 at the 3.4%, 6.73% and 12% thresholds). The same is true for overshoot estimates, as well. 
The poorer households are more burdened with COOPDE in Canada. As documented in O’Donnell 
et al., (2008), the phenomenon is explained by the inelastic nature of food expenditure. That is, 
food is a necessity, and when budget share considers non-food expenditure such as the capacity to 
pay approach used in this thesis, the difference between the rich and poor households is better 
distinguished. 
 
Table 3.2: The intensity of COOPED at various thresholds. 
 
 Budget share thresholds 
Out-of-pocket prescription drug 








    
Headcount 14.61% 6.12% 1.88% 
Overshoot 0.64% 0.32% 0.13% 
Mean Positive Overshoot (MPO) 4.37% 5.21% 7.14% 
    
 
Table 3.3: Measuring the distribution sensitivity of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug 
expenditures in Canada, 2016. 
 Budget share thresholds 
Out-of-pocket prescription drug 








    
Concentration index, CE -0.37% -0.47% -0.55% 
Rank-weighted headcount, Hrw  19.99% 9.02% 2.91% 
Concentration index, Co -0.46% -0.49% -0.46% 
Rank-weighted overshoot, Orw 21.26% 9.14% 2.74% 
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3.7 Impoverishment Effects of Payment  
Following the significant risks that financial catastrophe has for household’s welfare, the potential 
for impoverishments from out-of-pocket payments must be measured as well since out-of-pocket 
payments can push some households into poverty or deepen the poverty for some households. This 
measurement is the crux of this section.  As documented earlier, the federal government of Canada 
has institutionalized Canada’s first official poverty line through the “Poverty Reduction Act” 
(Canada, 2018). The poverty line is defined as the required minimum income level needed to meet 
the necessities of life (O’Donnell et al., 2008; Kakwani, 2010). Specifically, Canada’s official 
poverty line is a Market Basket Measure (MBM) that will be subject to continuous updates and 
improvements every five years (Corak, 2018; Homer, 2018). The official absolute poverty line is 
approximately $37,500 for a family of four (consisting of two children and two adults), and $18,750 
for a family of one in Canada. Having a homogenous poverty line is essential for unmasking 
horizontal inequality in society (Kakwani, 2010). It is important to note that poverty is analyzed 
on per capita/individual basis; hence, this study adjusted both OOPDE and household income using 
the equivalent household size metric. Furthermore, as recommended by Corak (2018), this study 
maintained the poverty line for a household of one as half the amount of the poverty line for a 
household of four. Moreover, for households with a size larger than one, this study used the 
equivalent household size to determine the per capita equivalent figure. A relative poverty line 
determined as 60% of the median of total per capita household income ($23,828) is also used to 
compare the results (Arsenijevic, Pavlova & Groot 2013). Analogous to catastrophic estimates 
presented earlier, the formula of poverty estimates is presented below. 
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Let Xi be the per capita income of an individual “I,” which indicates his or her total income 
before paying out-of-pocket for prescription drugs. Wi is the per capita OOPDE and PV be the 
poverty line. N is the sample size. An individual is poor if their pre-payment Xi is less than PV. 
That is 𝐻𝑖
ℎ= 1 if Xi < PV and Hi = 0 if otherwise. The percentage of the headcount of poverty in the 









       (3.15) 
The difference between the poverty line and Xi is defined as the poverty gap. It measures the 
depth of poverty (O’Donnell et al., 2008). Let 𝐺𝑖
𝑔
 be the Pre-Payment individual poverty gap, 
which is equal to 1 if PV - Xi > 0 and 0 otherwise. Then the percentage of people who experience 









         (3.16) 







⁄            (3.17) 
While the pre-payment mean-positive poverty gap measures the intensity of poverty among 







𝑝𝑝⁄            (3.18) 
Post payment poverty estimates can be easily obtained by replacing pre-payment income Xi 









 respectively.  
Finally, the impoverishing effect of OOPDE is derived by estimating the difference between 
the post-payments and pre-payment indices and is derived below: 
61 
 
a) Headcount: Himp = 𝐻𝑝𝑣
𝑝𝑠𝑡 −  𝐻𝑝𝑣
𝑝𝑝
 





c) Normalized poverty gap: NGimp= 𝑁𝐺𝑝𝑣
𝑝𝑠𝑡  −  𝑁𝐺𝑝𝑣
𝑝𝑝
 
d) Mean positive poverty gap: MPGimp= 𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑝𝑣
𝑝𝑠𝑡  −  𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑝𝑣
𝑝𝑝
 
The results of the impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket prescription drugs payment using 
Canada’s absolute and relative poverty lines are presented in table 3.4 below. A visual appraisal 
using a pen’s parade is also presented below in figure 3.4. The Gross of health payment column 
shows the prepayment household per capita income (Xi), while the net of health payment column 
shows the post-payment per capita income (Xi – Wi). Against both the absolute and relative 
absolute poverty line, the poverty headcount and gap. Based on the evidence that post-payment 
income headcount is slightly higher than those of the prepayment income levels, out-of-pocket 
prescription drug payments in Canada impoverishes more individuals. Against the absolute poverty 
line level, the difference is 0.51%, which means 0.51% of Canadians become poor when they pay 
out-of-pocket for their prescription drugs. Also, the relative difference is 5.09% at the absolute 
poverty line; when we estimate against the relative poverty line level, the relative difference is 
2.78%. 
Further, recall that the poverty gap is the difference between household per capita income 
and the poverty line. The results of table 3.4 show that the poverty gap against the absolute poverty 
line and the relative poverty line is $608.02 and $1511, respectively, and the relative difference of 
the normalized poverty gap is given as 4.41% and 4.10% at the absolute and relative poverty line 
respectively. The intensity of poverty among the already poor is the normalized mean poverty gap. 
Following the negative sign at the absolute poverty line level, it implies that around 0.74% of 
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Canadians were brought into poverty and not that poverty of the already poor is deepened. At the 
relative poverty line estimates, the poverty of the already poor is deepened by 0.39%.  
As shown in figure 3.3 below, using the absolute poverty line across provinces, poverty 
among the already poor is deepened slightly in Alberta, Prince Edward Island8, and in Ontario, 
when they make an OOPDE. In all other provinces, individuals are brought into poverty when they 
fill their prescription drugs. Manitoba and Nova Scotia had the largest population that fell into 
poverty due to out-of-pocket prescription drug payments, and British Columbia had the least 
population proportion falling below the poverty line due to non-reimbursed drugs payments. Figure 
3.2 shows the visual appraisal pre and post-payment poverty headcount estimates across provinces 
in Canada. The highest prevalence of poverty occurred in Nova Scotia, Newfound land, Quebec 
and Manitoba and the provinces with the least prevalence of poverty from out-of-pocket payments 













8 It is important to note that the sample proportion in the provinces of Prince Edward Island and Alberta is small with 
regards to Saskatchewan Research Data Center guidelines. So, the deepening of the poverty in the provinces of Prince 
Edward Island and Alberta might not be as significant as that occurring in Ontario. 
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of population impoverished by OOPDE, by province  
 
Figure 3.3: Impoverishing normalized mean positive gap impact estimates of OOPDE by 
province, Canada, 2016 
 
 
The Pen’s Parade of poverty, in figure 3.4 below, describes changes in income as a result of 
expenditure on out-of-pocket prescription drugs for individuals in the lower half of the spectrum 












































































The horizontal axis shows the ranked cumulative proportion of the population by per capita income 
gross of health payment. The vertical axis shows the changes in the per capita income before and 
after health payment. The changes in income is represented by the gap between the income before 
health payment (blue line) and the income after the health payment (red line). Figure 3.4 can be 
explained using the Median Voter Theory (MVT) (Mou, 2013). It is apparent from the graph below 
that only individuals in the lower half of the spectrum of income distribution experience poverty 
when they fill their prescription drugs. The MVT explains that since each vote’s tax contribution 
to a social program is based on their income, the tax contribution of an individual with a below-
average income is less than the average cost of the social program. While individuals whose income 
is more than average income will bear greater than average tax contribution. Hence, poorer 
individuals tend to support, and richer individual oppose the creation of social programs based on 
the simple cost-benefit framework. To get a particular social program financed, there is the need 
to appeal to the median voter, who is somewhat indifferent toward the creation of such programs. 
The Pen’s Parade shows that the individuals with a median income (at the 50th percentile of the 
income distribution) experience no poverty when they fill their prescription drugs. Therefore, 
regardless of how attractive it is for a program like Pharmacare to be created in Canada for groups 
such as the working poor and those whose income is less than the absolute poverty line, it appears 























































         
Poverty head 
count 
10.02% 10.53% 0.51% 5.09% 20.54% 21.11% 0.57% 2.78% 
         
Poverty gap 608.02 634.26 26.24 4.32% 1511 1572 61 4.04% 
         
Normalized 
poverty gap 
3.40% 3.55% 0.15% 4.41% 6.34% 6.60% 0.26% 4.10% 
         
Normalized mean 
poverty gap 
33.95% 33.70% -0.25% -0.74% 30.87% 31.26% 0.39% 1.26% 
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3.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyzed the catastrophic and impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket prescription drug 
payments in Canada. The effects were examined using the 2016 Survey of Household Spending. The 
results showed that a significant percentage of Canadian households incurred financial catastrophe 
at all the three thresholds of catastrophic payment presented. As high as 14.61% of Canadian 
households spent more than 3.4% of their expenditure on prescription drugs. Hence, despite the 
provincial and federal efforts, there is not enough financial protection for households against 
financial catastrophe in Canada. The negative concentration indices also showed that poorer 
households compared to wealthier households are more likely to exceed the threshold of catastrophic 
payments in Canada. The intensity of catastrophic payments is also higher among poorer households 
compared to richer households. 
The results also show that there is significant variation across provinces in catastrophic out-of-
pocket prescription drug expenditures. Quebec had the highest percentage of population with 
catastrophic drug payment at both the 3.4% and 6.73% budget share thresholds, and Ontario had the 
least financial catastrophic burden across the three thresholds. A visual appraisal of this is given by 
the three diagrams below. The provincial drug plans have different eligibility and depth of drug 
coverage. However, an interesting fact is that Quebec used to have the least financial catastrophe 
among the provinces during the 2009 period, unlike what is obtainable in 2015 (Caldbick et al., 
2015). The next chapter explains these trends and more.  
The final part of this chapter presented the impoverishing estimates of out-of-pocket 
prescription drug expenditures. The findings showed that only individuals in the lower half of the 
income distribution of the Canadian population experienced poverty due to out-of-pocket 
prescription drug expenditures. Individuals who become impoverished as a result of out-of-pocket 
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prescription drug expenditures is given as the difference between the gross of health payments (per 
capita household income) and net of health payments estimates (per capita household income less 
per capita household out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures). Close to 73,000 Canadians fell 
below the Canadian absolute poverty line after they incurred out-of-pocket prescription drug 
payments. That is, without having to pay for prescription drugs out-of-pocket, about 73,000 
individuals could be lifted from poverty.  
An important factor that could have led to this empirical evidence is the significant cost-sharing 
mechanisms (premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance) in the existing patchwork system of 
prescription drug plans in Canada.  Moreover, regarding cost-sharing mechanisms in Canada, there 
is the need for special attention to households who fall below the average income, are working poor, 
or the households below the absolute poverty line. Therefore, this chapter presented viable indicators 
for assessing the impact of the existing patchwork system of prescription drugs on Canadians in 
terms of financial catastrophe and impoverishment. In the next chapter, I will analyze the 
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Descriptive statistics of the variables: 
 
Table 3.5: Out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures as a percentage of total household 
expenditure by province. 
 
 NL PEI NS NB PQ ONT MB SK AB BC 








Table 3.6: Weighted distribution of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in Canada, 
2016 by dollar amount 
 
Variables Percentage of 
individuals with non-
zero dollar OOPDE 
Percentage of 
individuals with zero-
dollar OOPDE  
 
    
Canada 63.21 36.79  
    
Age (years)    
< 35  50.96 49.04  
35-50  56.31 43.69  
50-65 62.20 37.80  
≥65 80.99 19.01  
    
Gender    
Male 61.64 38.36  
Female 64.68 35.32  
    
Per capita PL income    
>Ave 60.73 39.27  
RPL-AVE 68.55 31.45  
ABL-RPL 68.73 31.27  
BAPL 44.50 55.50  
    
Education    
Below high school 70.12 29.88  
High school 59.69 40.31  
Between 64.06 35.94  
≥ University 61.22 38.78  
    
Provinces    
NL 71.52 28.48  
PEI 74.70 25.30  
NS 67.59 32.41  
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NB 71.26 28.74  
PQ 74.40 25.60  
ONT 55.84 44.16  
MB 62.88 37.12  
SK 64.54 35.46  
AB 62.01 37.99  
BC 59.93 40.07  
    
Employment income     
Paid/self/investment 
income 




70.89 29.11  
    
Marital status    
Separated/divorced/never 
married) 
54.35 45.65  
Married/common-
law/widowed 
67.55 32.45  
*BAPL- Below absolute poverty line * ABL-RPL – Working poor * RPL-Ave – Between relative poverty line and 
average per capita income *>Ave – Greater than average per capita income 
 
Figure 3.5: Prevalence of OOPDE across provinces at different thresholds  








Figure 3.6: World Health Organization’s health systems framework showing the relationship 
between health building blocks and health outcomes. 
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Adapted from WHO (2010) 
Figure 3.7: Pen’s Parade – Effect of OOPDE on Households in Canada, 2016 (individuals ≥ 50th 












FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH CATASTROPHIC OUT-OF-POCKET 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG EXPENDITURES IN CANADA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the regression analysis and descriptive statistics results of the factors associated 
with catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in Canada. Furthermore, to assess the 
factors associated with catastrophic drug spending at various severity levels, this chapter also uses a 
Partial Proportional Odds (PPO) model. While a lot of literature has used logistic, Probit, Poisson 
and Tobit regression models to explain the determinants of catastrophic spending, the use of a PPO 
to assess the factors associated with catastrophic health spending at various severity levels is novel 
to the literature. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 give the background and literature review of the determinants 
of catastrophic health expenditure, sections 4.4 and 4.5 explain the methods and results, and section 
4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Background 
 
The analysis in chapter three of this thesis demonstrated the substantial financial risks associated 
with the out-of-pocket prescription drug payments in Canada. Due to significant cost-sharing under 
the existing system, some Canadian households are unable to pay for their prescriptions (Law et al., 
2012; Morgan & Boothe, 2015; Tang, Ghali & Manns, 2014). Cost-sharing mechanisms (e.g., 
deductibles and coinsurance/copayments) are provisions that allow for individuals and insurance 
companies to jointly pay some portion of the cost of the insured prescription drugs (Daw & Morgan 
2010; Hurley, 2010). A deductible is a type of cost-sharing mechanism that specifies the maximum 
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amount that the insured must pay before the insurance company starts paying (either the full amount 
or shared) for the cost of the prescription drugs. Coinsurance is usually a percentage of the 
prescription drugs' prices that the insured must still pay after the deductible has been met. A 
copayment, however, is a fixed amount that the insured must pay per prescription. A premium is a 
monthly or yearly payment to maintain the insurance package (Daw & Morgan, 2012; Hurley, 2010). 
In the literature, financial risk pooling system, as well as some sociodemographic factors such as 
household size, gender and age, are associated with the catastrophic impact of out-of-pocket 
expenditures (Barros, Bastos & Damaso, 2011; Bennett & Dismuke, 2010; Water, Anderson & Mays, 
2004). The above factors are also associated with the general efficiency and equity of a health care 
system (Goudge et al., 2009). As the need for financial protection in Canada’s universal health 
coverage continues to grow, appropriate policy interventions are required to deal with the financial 
risks of some citizen groups. As a first step, this chapter analyses the determinants of the prevalence 
and intensity of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in Canada. The chapter 
uses bivariate, multi-variate logistic and PPO models to determine the association between 
sociodemographic factors and the prevalence of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug 
expenditures in Canada.  
4.3 Overview of the Literature 
Several studies from Africa, Latin America, Asia, North America, and Europe have evaluated the 
determinants of financial protection in households. Some of the factors associated with vulnerability 
to catastrophic payments include household income, gender and age of household head, geographical 
location, educational level, employment status, health condition, the nature of in-patient and out-
patient services, and health insurance (Barros, Bastos & Damaso, 2011; Berki, 1986; Gotsadze, 
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Zoidze & Rukhadze, 2009; Knaul, Wong & Arreola-Ornelas, 2012; Water, Anderson & Mays, 2004; 
Su, Kouyate & Flessa, 2006). 
In their study on catastrophic health spending in Brazil, Barros, Bastos and Damaso (2011) 
used Poisson regression in determining households that were most vulnerable to incurring 
catastrophic payments. The study documented that households with elderly persons had a higher 
chance of incurring catastrophic payment.  For all but the lowest income quintile, private health 
insurance had a rather positive association with catastrophic expenditure. The scholars noted that this 
result could have been from the incomprehensive nature of private health insurance packages in the 
country that leave out substantial aspects of health care such as home care, prescription drugs, among 
others. A piece of analogous evidence is documented in Thailand in Somkotra and Lagrada (2009), 
where the specific taste for private health care services among well-to-do households increase their 
prevalence of catastrophic spending. 
Further, in Kenya, Kimani (2014) found that the government-owned National Hospital 
Insurance Fund mandated to provide health insurance to Kenyans above 18 years of age did little to 
protect Kenyans from catastrophic and impoverishment spending because of the limited range of 
service coverage it offered, unlike the counterpart private insurance. Therefore, there is confounding 
evidence in the literature regarding the existence of insurance and its impact on financial catastrophe 
and impoverishment. A similar submission can be made for Canada where a large proportion of the 
population has some form of insurance coverage, but as results from chapter three of this thesis 
shows, there exists a significant burden on some households’ capacity to pay.  Hence, tastes and 
preferences for insurance and comprehensiveness of the insurance package are important to the 
effectiveness of a health insurance scheme. 
Using a logit model and the Burkina-Faso data, Su, Kouyate and Flessa (2006) showed the 
household income quartile was a critical factor that influenced catastrophic expenditure, and a similar 
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result was documented in Cruz et al., (2006) for Mexico and Buigut, Ettarh and Amendah, (2015) 
for Kenya. In Burkina-Faso, although poorer households had a low frequency of illness reports, they 
experienced significant catastrophic payments relative to higher-income households. Other factors 
identified were the prevalence of adult illness, the presence of chronic illnesses and health care 
utilization. The study submitted that the opportunity cost of health payments could sometimes be 
high enough to prevent households from seeking treatment all together except in extreme situations 
where death could occur. 
Furthermore, in Latin America, Perticara (2008) showed that a significant burden from out-of-
pocket payment expenditure was directly related to the nature of service (in-patient) and not directly 
on the household income capacity. And in studies such as Knaul et al., (2007), geographical location, 
presence of seniors as well as low income were directly correlated with catastrophic health care 
spending. Lara and Gomez (2011), using a Probit model found that lower-income households with 
no substantial financial protection from social security, and households with heads who are seniors 
had a higher chance of incurring catastrophic spending. This result is like those found in Merlis 
(2002) for the USA, Ngcamphalala (2016) for South Africa, Somkotra and Lagrada (2009) for 
Thailand, and Torres and Knaul (2003) for Mexico.  
Using the 1997 Canadian data, Kapur and Basu (2005) built a database from Survey of 
Consumer Finances, National Population Health Survey, Statistics Canada Survey of Household 
Spending and the income data of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency to determine the 
probability and extent to which Canadians have prescription drugs insurance coverage. The scholars 
simulated the specificity of the type of insurance coverage in the country – public coverage, private 
coverage and no coverage - and found that around 96% of Canadians have insurance coverage in 
some form. The scholars then used a Tobit model to analyze the burden of prescription drug payments 
across the province, age, household income, gender, area of residence and coverage status. The 
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results showed that females experienced a marginally higher burden compared to their male 
counterparts, and households with private drug plans had a lower burden compared to households 
with public plans or no insurance plan at all. Also, the Atlantic and Prairie provinces showed higher 
burdens of prescription drug payments when compared to Ontario. 
Further, Caldbick et al., (2015) used a logistic regression model to determine the burden of 
catastrophic prescription drug payment in Canada across income, provinces, age and education. Like 
the earlier work by Kapur and Basu, the results showed significant variation across provinces. Also, 
an analysis across households showed that compared to households in the fourth income quartile, 
households in the first two quartiles had a higher probability of experiencing catastrophic 
prescription drug payments. Individuals aged 50 and above also had a higher probability of incurring 
catastrophic payments compared to individuals aged 35 and younger. Finally, those with educational 
levels below university education had a higher probability of experiencing a significant burden from 
prescription drug payments compared with those with university degrees and higher. 
In general, the studies in the literature have focused on understanding the odds of the vulnerable 
population in incurring catastrophic spending at different thresholds. Because the response variable 
is dichotomous in this case, a simple logistic regression is appropriate for such analysis. As 
documented earlier, other studies such as Barros, Bastos and Damaso (2011), Sene and Cisse (2015), 
Nguyen, Rajkotia and Wang (2011) have employed Probit and Poisson regression as well. The 
review above has shown that factors such as the presence of chronic illness, nature of health care 
service, age, private insurance, income, education, among others, are associated with catastrophic 
health spending. However, due to the limited availability of data in the 2016 SHS, the independent 
variables used in this chapter are household heads’ age, marital status, education, employment 
income type, as well as household per capita income and province of residence.  
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This study uses the conventional logistic model to analyze the odds of incurring catastrophic 
out-of-pocket payments in Canada at selected thresholds. Also, this study created a hierarchical 
category for the dependent variable to capture the severity of catastrophic spending among 
vulnerable population groups in Canada and a partial proportional odds model is used. While the use 
of PPO models has found relevance in education (Soon, 2010), transportation (Sasidharam & 
Menendez, 2014), etc., to the best of our knowledge, this approach is novel to catastrophic health 
spending literature. The methodology section explains this in detail. 
 4.4 Methods 
As noted earlier and following other studies, logistics regression was applied to the household level 
data of the 2016 Canadian Survey of Household Spending to assess the determinants of the 
catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures. The response variable is the dichotomous 
variable that represents the occurrence of catastrophic spending, as given in equation 3.8 of this 
thesis. For the PPO Model, the intensity of catastrophic spending at the thresholds was categorized 
into three levels based on severity. The intensity is coded in descending order as follows:  a very 
high burden = 3, a high burden = 2, a medium burden = 1, and a low burden = 0. 
4.4.1 Bivariate and Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis 
Recall COOPDEh = 1 if y* ≥ 6.73% 
        COOPDEh = 0 if otherwise 
 
The results for 3.4% and 12% were presented in chapter three of this thesis. Given the dichotomous 
nature of the response variable, the simple regression model is given as follows: 
y* = α + ∑βiXi + ε (4.1) 
Where y* is the response variable representing the occurrence of catastrophic prescription drug 
spending at a threshold. βi is the coefficient of the independent variable, α is the intercept and ε is 
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the error term. Xi is independent variables based on the literature on the financial burden of 
prescription drug payment in Canada (Caldbick et al., 2015; Kapur & Basu, 2005; McLeod et al., 
2011). The independent variables used in this thesis are household heads’ age, marital status, 
education, employment income type, household per capita income and province of residence. Gender 
was not statistically significant at the bivariate level of the analysis and was not included in the 
model. Additionally, because household size had been accounted for in the capacity-to-pay approach 
that resulted in the response variable, household size was omitted as an independent variable.  
The probability of a Canadian household facing catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug 
payments is then given by the logit distribution function: 
Pr (COOPDEh = 1|X) = F(β X’) = 
 eβX’
(1 + e−βX’)
  (4.2) 
The odds ratio associated with the probability is then derived for bivariate (here Xi takes on 
only one of the independent variables) and multivariate (here Xi takes on all independent variables) 




 = α +∑βiXi       (4.3) 
P(x) is the probability of incurring catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug payments. βi 
gives the parameters associated with the independent variables Xi, and α is the model’s constant. 
Only the independent variables that were significant in bivariate regressions were included in the 
multivariate regression. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the variables used in the multivariate regression analysis of the factors 





Table 4.1: Variables description 
Categories of variables           Definition Categories Anticipated 
effect 
    
Per capita household 
income  
Household income is the value in Canadian 
dollars that each member of a household 
contributes to its sustenance (e.g. food, rent 
and utilities). This is then adjusted by 
equivalent household size 
 
0 = >Ave 
1 = RPL-AVE 
2 = ABL-RPL 
3 = BAPL 
Negative 
Head of household’s main 
employment income 
source  
This implies the major source of income of 
the head of household in the year under 
review. 
 




    
Marital status (IV) This is the marital status the head of 







    
Head of household’s 
education (IV) 
This is the highest level of education the head 
of household reports in the survey. 
 
0 = University and greater 
1 = Between 
2 = Below high school and 
high school 
Negative 
    
Head of household’s age 
(IV) 
This is the reported age the head of 
household reports in the survey. 
 
0 = ≤ 40 years 
1 = 40-64years 
2 = ≥ 65 years 
Positive 
    
Province of residence (IV) This is the province of residence as 
confirmed by the household for the year 
under review. 
 
0 = Ontario 
1 = British Columbia 
2 = Prairie 
3 = Atlantic 
4 = Quebec 
Uncertain 
    
Catastrophic out-of-
pocket prescription drug 
expenditures 
This measures whether a household incurs 
catastrophic expenditures at the given 
threshold 
0 = if household does not 
experience catastrophic 
payment 














4.4.2 Logistic Regression Results 
The multivariate logistic regression results at the 6.73% threshold are presented in Tables 4.2 and 
4.3. For the multivariate model, pairwise correlations using the Spearman correlation coefficient 
among independent variables were less than 0.6, indicating the absence of multicollinearity (Akoglu, 
2018). Statistics Canada sample weights were applied to the estimations. Concerning the survey of 
household spending’s weights and methodology, please refer to the website provided in the reference 
section (Statistics Canada, 2016). Additionally, the Balanced Repeated Replications (BRR), which 
account for sampling variability and uses the survey bootstrap weights were employed to estimate 
the confidence interval as well as the standard error of COOPDE. At all three threshold percentages 
of COOPDE, gender was statistically insignificant. The insignificance of gender might mean that 
coverage in our existing system does not discriminate based on sex.  The post-estimation goodness 
of fit test [linktest (_hatsq) and Stata v15 estatgof] for the model showed that the model fits the data.  
An important finding from this research is that the probability of incurring catastrophic out-of-
pocket prescription drug payments in Canada varies significantly with age. In Canada, seniors are 
approximately six times more likely to incur catastrophic spending at the 6.73% threshold compared 
to individuals aged 40 years and younger. The value is 2.4 times for individuals between the ages of 
40 and 64 years compared to their counterparts who are aged 40 years and younger. A viable 
explanation for these findings is the Grossman-Wagstaff theory of demand for health, which 
indicates that health demands increase with age (Grossman, 2000; Ngcamphala, 2016). Another 
important finding from the empirical evidence is that the household head’s level of education affects 
the probability of incurring catastrophic spending. Compared to households headed by individuals 
with a university degree or higher, those headed by individuals with an educational level below high 
school are 1.86 times more vulnerable.  
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The results also showed cross-provincial variation in the determinants of catastrophic out-of-
pocket prescription drug expenditures (COOPDE), especially for the working poor, the effect of per 
capita income on COOPDE significantly depended on the province of residence. The working poor 
in the Prairie provinces had the highest probability of incurring COOPDE (5.11 times) compared 
with their counterparts in Ontario. The same phenomenon is true for the working poor in Quebec 
(4.19 times) and the Atlantic provinces (3.63 times) compared with their counterparts in Ontario.  
Furthermore, Figure 4.1 below shows the predicted probabilities of COOPDE at 6.73% 
threshold across provincial and income categories. The predicted probabilities were calculated using 
the margins of the estimation of the model. The visual appraisal shows that the working poor (ABL-
RPL) of Quebec, Prairie and Atlantic provinces have a higher predicted probabilities of incurring 








Table 4.2: Multivariate analysis of the association between sociodemographic factors and the 





Variable Odds Ratio (OR) of COOPDE 
(95% CI) 
  
Age group, years (Ref: ≤ 40) 1.0 
40-64 years 2.40 (1.46-3.94) 
>65 years 5.95 (3.33-10.62) 
  
   
Provinces (Ref: Ontario) 1.0 
British Columbia 1.07 (0.49-2.35) 
Prairiea 0.77 (0.42-1.42) 
Atlanticb 1.02 (0.54-1.90) 
Quebec 1.41 (0.65-3.07) 
  
  
Marital status (Ref: Separated/divorced/never 
married) 
1.0 
Married/common-law/widowed 1.26 (0.94-1.69) 
  
  
Employment income (Ref: 
Paid/self/investment income) 
1.0 





Education (Ref: University and greater) 1.0 
Between high school and university  1.47 (0.99-2.16) 
Below high school and high school  1.86 (1.25-2.75) 
  
  
Per capita income (>Ave) 1.0 
RPL-Ave 1.41 (0.71-2.80) 
ABL-RPL 0.78 (0.24-2.55) 





Table 4.3: Multivariate analysis of the interaction between per capita income and province and 
the prevalence of COOPDE in Canada at the 6.73% threshold  
Combination of 
variables 
 Odds Ratio (OR) of 
COOPDE (95% CI) 
Per capita income and provinces  
RPL-Ave (vs >Ave) British Columbia (vs 
Ont.) 
0.95 (0.34-2.70) 
RPL-Ave (vs >Ave) Prairie (vs Ont.) 2.22 (0.96-5.11) 
RPL-Ave (vs >Ave) Atlantic (vs Ont.) 1.50 (0.68-3.29) 
RPL-Ave (vs >Ave) Quebec (vs Ont.) 1.50 (059-3.79) 
ABL-RPL (vs >Ave) British Columbia (vs 
Ont.) 
2.21 (0.52-9.34) 
ABL-RPL (vs >Ave) Prairie (vs Ont.) 5.11 (1.51-17.28) 
ABL-RPL (vs >Ave) Atlantic (vs Ont.) 3.63 (1.09-11.98) 
ABL-RPL (vs >Ave) Quebec (vs Ont.) 4.19 (1.09-16.02) 
BAPL (vs >Ave) British Columbia (vs 
Ont.) 
0.82 (0.19-3.61) 
BAPL (vs >Ave) Prairie (vs Ont.) 3.08 (0.69-13.84) 
BAPL (vs >Ave) Atlantic (vs Ont.) 1.42 (0.42-4.88) 
BAPL (vs >Ave) Quebec (vs Ont.) 1.14 (0.27-4.81) 
 _cons 0.01 (0.00-0.01) 
 _hatsq 0.65 
 F(9,979) 0.19 
 Prob>F 0.99 
Abbreviations: OR - odds ratio; vs - versus; CI - confidence interval; Ref - reference group 
a Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta 
b Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Labrador 













Figure 4.1: Graph showing the interaction between income and province categories. 
 
4.5 Analysis of the severities of COOPDE using a Partial Proportional 
Odds Model (PPO) 
 
This section analyses the severities of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures in 
Canada across smaller cut off points. As a robustness check to the previous threshold above, we used 
the fixed threshold of 5% provided by the National Pharmaceutical Strategy in their 2006 report 
(Health Canada, 2006). This threshold was modelled using a Partial Proportional Odds (PPO) model. 
For this section, we used British Columbia as a reference group because the estimates are comparable 
to those of Ontario. 
Following Sasidharam and Menendez (2014), Williams (2006) and Williams (2016), a PPO 
model for this study can then be specified as follows. Let Yi denote the observed level of catastrophic 
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payments for prescription drugs in Canada (COOPDEh). Equation 4.4 shows the intensity and 
severity of catastrophic payments for prescription drugs at the threshold levels defined below: 
Yi* = α + ∑βXi + ε (4.4) 
Y = {
0,   𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛, 𝑖𝑓 𝑌∗  <  0.05  
1, 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛,   𝑖𝑓𝑌∗   ≥  0.05 <  0.10
2, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛,    𝑖𝑓𝑌∗ ≥  0.10 <  0.15 
3, 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛,   𝑖𝑓𝑌∗ ≥  0.15
 
 
Let M represent the count of the severity levels of catastrophic payments. In this case, M is 4. 
Then the probability of incurring catastrophic payments at a catastrophic severity level (say j) is 
given as  
P(Yi>j) = Pij = eαj + Xiβj/ 1 + e (αj + Xiβj); J = 1, 2,…M-1 (4.5) 
Where β represents a uniform value for all severity levels given that the proportional odds 
assumption is met; here, meeting the proportional odds assumption means that all the independent 
variables including household heads’ age, education, major source of income, as well as household 
income and province of residence all have equal effect on the prevalence of catastrophic spending 
from the low to very high burden level. Because of this equal effect, an ordered logistic regression 
would seem to be the appropriate analysis to employ. However, in this study, variables including the 
Quebec province dummy variable and major sources of income from government transfers, 
miscellaneous, and others did not meet the proportional odds assumptions, for these reasons, I use 
the PPO model. The results of the PPO model imply that the coefficients of the two variables that 
did not meet the assumption can vary across the model. The Gologit2 Stata program, which tests the 
proportional odds assumption as well as estimates the odds ratios, was used to fit the model in this 




4.5.1 The Partial Proportional Odds Model Results 
This section presents the results of the PPO model in table 4.4 below. Pairwise Spearman correlations 
among independent variables were less than 0.6, indicating the absence of multicollinearity (Akoglu, 
2018). The statistic to measure the predictive power of the PPO model is given as the Percentage 
Correctly Predicted (PCP). In this study, the PCP was 89.27%, which implies that our model correctly 
predicts about 89% of the observed outcome. The PPO model is thus robust. 
In the PPO model, there are four COOPDE severity categories; hence, the results of the PPO 
model are presented in three panels. The response variables for the first panel of the PPO model – 
PPO(0) is coded as 0 vs 1, 2, and 3; PPO(1) is coded as 0, 1 vs 2 and 3; and PPO(2) is coded as 0, 1, 
2 vs 3. The proportional odds assumption implies that all explanatory variables have the same effect 
on COOPDE across the severity levels. The results are presented in Table 4.4 using an odds ratio 
and at a 95% confidence interval. An odds ratio greater than 1 means an increased likelihood of 
experiencing COOPDE, and the reverse is also true. For example, the odds ratio in the first panel 
suggests the probability of incurring COOPDE as a low burden as opposed to the other three 
categories.  
Furthermore, as specified in Sasidharam and Menendez (2014), the variable categories that do 
not meet the proportional odds assumption are also interpreted using marginal effects. A positive 
marginal effect value indicates that the probability of incurring COOPDE is higher when an 
independent variable increases by one unit and the reverse is also true. 
When interpreting PPO models, the reference group is both the present category and a lower 
category where obtainable (Soon, 2010). Hence, an odds ratio greater than 1 means that an increase 
in the independent variable increases the likelihood of an individual incurring COOPDE at a higher 
category than the one they currently are at. An odds ratio less than 1 implies that an increase in the 
93 
 
independent variable increases the likelihood of an individual incurring COOPDE in a lower 
category than their current one (Soon, 2010; Williams, 2006).  
In summary, the interpretation of each panel is as follows: individuals have a higher probability 
of incurring COOPDE at higher severity burden levels compared to their current category (or lower). 
For example, an odds ratio value of 5.74 means that seniors in Canada have a higher likelihood of 
incurring COOPDE at medium, high, and very high burden thresholds than at low burden thresholds. 
Across all panels, individuals between the ages of 40 and 65 years are 2.50 times more likely to 
experience COOPDE at higher burden thresholds than those at lower thresholds. Furthermore, as 
obtained in the multivariate logistic regression, significant interaction was found here between 
income and province as well, and these results are interpreted in the same manner: in the Prairie 
provinces, individuals who earn between the relative poverty line and average income levels are 2.27 
times more likely to incur catastrophic spending at higher thresholds. The working poor also have a 
higher probability of incurring COOPDE at higher severity levels (2.84 times) in the Prairies. The 
same is true for residents of Quebec (3.10 times) and the Atlantic provinces (2.76 times). Again, the 
severity of catastrophic spending is higher in Quebec and among the working poor. In summary, the 
results show that for most of the variable categorizations, individuals have a higher probability of 
incurring COOPDE at higher severity levels compared to lower categories.  
Similarly, from the positive values of their marginal effects, individuals in Quebec and 
individuals whose major source of employment income is government transfers have a higher 
probability of incurring COOPDE at all severity levels.  
Table 4.4: Partial proportional odds model for severities in catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription 







Variable Odds Ratio (OR) of COOPDE (95% 
CI) 
Low burden (0)  
Age group, years (Ref: ≤ 40) 1.0 
40-64 years 2.50 (1.67-3.74) 
>65 years 5.74 (3.60-9.17) 
   
Provinces (Ref:  British Columbia) 1.0 
Ontario 0.59 (0.31-1.12) 
Prairiea 0.71 (0.41-1.22) 
Atlanticb 0.78 (0.45-1.35) 
Quebec 1.21 (0.63-2.35) 
  
Employment income (Ref: Paid/self/investment 
income) 
1.0 




Education (Ref: University and greater) 1.0 
Between 1.65 (1.20-2.26) 
Below high school and high school  1.87 (1.37-2.55) 
  
Per capita income (>Ave) 1.0 
RPL-Ave 1.12 (0.63-2.00) 




Quebec                                                                                            





Government transfer/miscellaneous/all other 
sources 
 
Medium burden (1) 
Quebec                                                                                            
Government transfer/miscellaneous/all other 
sources 
 
High burden (2) 
Quebec                                                                                            











                                              
  0.44 (0.25-0.76) 
0.63 (0.39-1.00) 
 
                                               
                                               




                                            




Abbreviations: OR - odds ratio; vs - versus; CI - confidence interval; Ref - reference group 
a Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta 
b Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Labrador 
Note: Statistically significant values are boldened 
 
 
Figure 4.2 below show the interaction in the PPO model between provinces and income. To 
make the argument clearer, we graph the interaction showing the income categories against provinces 
here. The graph shows a clear progression in financial catastrophe for the working poor (green line) 
especially for the province of Quebec, followed by Atlantic provinces and the Prairies. In other 
words, at the higher thresholds (greater than 5%), residents of these three provinces who are working 
poor have a higher predicted probability of incurring financial catastrophe when they make out-of-
pocket prescription drugs payments. 
Combination of variables  Odds Ratio (OR) of 
COOPDE (95% CI) 
Per capita income and provinces  
RPL-Ave (vs >Ave) Ontario (vs BC.) 0.70 (0.74-3.90) 
RPL-Ave (vs >Ave) Prairie (vs BC.) 2.27 (1.16-4.47) 
RPL-Ave (vs >Ave) Atlantic (vs BC.) 1.90 (0.97-3.71) 
RPL-Ave (vs >Ave) Quebec (vs BC.) 1.74 (0.81-3.72) 
ABL-RPL (vs >Ave) Ontario (vs BC.) 1.02 (0.18-5.78) 
ABL-RPL (vs >Ave) Prairie (vs BC.) 2.84 (1.18-6.82) 
ABL-RPL (vs >Ave) Atlantic (vs BC.) 2.76 (1.21-6.32) 
ABL-RPL (vs >Ave) Quebec (vs BC.) 3.10 (1.29-7.83) 
BAPL (vs >Ave) Ontario (vs BC.) 1.99 (0.57-7.00) 
BAPL (vs >Ave) Prairie (vs BC.) 2.89 (0.81-10.28) 
BAPL (vs >Ave) Atlantic (vs BC.) 1.85 (0.65-5.31) 
BAPL (vs >Ave) Quebec (vs BC.) 1.41 (0.45-4.44) 
 _cons 0.01 (0.01-0.03) 
 _hatsq (0) 0.39 
 _hatsq (1) 0.52 
 _hatsq (2) 0.86 
   





















4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
The results above have shown that the absence of a universal insurance program for prescription 
drugs like Medicare has led to significant variation in prescription drug coverage across provinces in 
Canada. Other scholars have reached similar conclusions (e.g., Caldbick et al., 2015; McLeod et al., 
2011; Sanmartin et al., 2014; Sutherland & Dinh, 2017). The diverse private insurance programs 
have done little to protect Canadians across different age groups, educational levels, and income 
levels from catastrophic spending. This situation could have arisen because, in the existing 
patchwork system diverse eligibility criteria exist for enrollment and coverage (Anis, Guh & Wang, 
2001; Campbell et al., 2017; Daw & Morgan, 2012; Demers et al., 2008; Kapur & Basu, 2005). 
Specifically, some of the programs depend heavily on premiums and cost-sharing mechanisms (Daw 
& Morgan, 2012). 
While Quebec has a mandatory prescription drug insurance policy for all its residents, the 
results of this study have shown that, compared to other provinces and across all income groups, the 
residents of Quebec are doing poorly in terms of being protected against COOPDE. Interestingly, in 
Caldbick et al. (2015), Quebec had better indicators than other provinces for protection from 
COOPDE, but the dynamics of the insurance program have since changed. Residents of Quebec are 
now subject to increased premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance payments (34.9%), a combination 
well documented in the literature to create substantial barriers to health care access (Campbell et al., 
2017). Similar to Quebec, the Prairie provinces have little protection from COOPDE. Alberta’s 
program involves premiums, copayments (30%) but a maximum out-of-pocket payment limit, 
Saskatchewan’s program requires a 35% copayment after the deductible has been reached but no 
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maximum out-of-pocket limit. In Manitoba, there is no premium payment but significant deductibles 
to be paid. The same situation is true for the Atlantic Provinces. 
According to the UHC cube in Chapter Two, Quebec has a full length (the entire population is 
covered), good breadth (outpatient prescription drugs are covered), but a very shallow depth 
(significant cost-sharing). Hence, the presence of insurance does not necessarily result in the absence 
of catastrophic spending. Similar conclusions were reached in Brazil (Barros, Bastos & Damaso, 
2011) and Thailand (Somkotra & Lagrada, 2009). The consequences of the UHC cube in Canada 
indicate that the working poor is more likely to face financial ruin than those with higher per capita 
income levels. This result is supported in the literature (e.g., Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015; 
Onwujekwe, Hanson & Uzochukwu, 2012; Su, Kouyate & Flessa, 2006). The burden is likely higher 
for the working poor because those with higher incomes have access to resources and favourable 
insurance packages to protect them against financial risks (Ngcamphala, 2016). The empirical 
evidence suggests that a federal financial protection scheme, particularly for the working poor, would 
benefit numerous individuals. The simulation of such a program forms the basis of the next chapter 
of this thesis. Meanwhile, one solid conclusion is apparent: the working poor and seniors in Canada 
need a prepayment insurance scheme that reduces/eliminates the cost-sharing payments they are 








Abu-Zaineh, M., Romdhane, H. B., Ventelou, B., Moatti, J. P., & Chokri, A. (2013). Appraising 
financial protection in health: the case of Tunisia. International journal of health care finance 
and economics, 13(1), 73-93. 
Akoglu, H. (2018). User's guide to correlation coefficients. Turkish journal of emergency 
medicine, 18(3), 91-93. 
Anis, A. H., Guh, D., & Wang, X. H. (2001). A dog's breakfast: prescription drug coverage varies 
widely across Canada. Medical care, 315-326. 
Barros, A. J., Bastos, J. L., & Dâmaso, A. H. (2011). Catastrophic spending on health care in Brazil: 
private health insurance does not seem to be the solution. Cadernos de saude publica, 27, s254-
s262. 
Bennett, K. J., & Dismuke, C. E. (2010). Families at financial risk due to high ratio of out-of-pocket 
health care expenditures to total income. Journal of health care for the poor and 
underserved, 21(2), 691-703. 
Berki, S. E. (1986). A look at catastrophic medical expenses and the poor. Health affairs, 5(4), 138-
145. 
Buigut, S., Ettarh, R., & Amendah, D. D. (2015). Catastrophic health expenditure and its 
determinants in Kenya slum communities. International journal for equity in health, 14(1), 46. 
Caldbick, S., Wu, X., Lynch, T., Al-Khatib, N., Andkhoie, M., & Farag, M. (2015). The financial 
burden of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenses in Canada. International journal of health 
economics and management, 15(3), 329-338. 
Cambridge: Harvard Global Equity Initiative, in collaboration with Mexican Health Foundation and 
International Development Research Centre; distributed by Harvard University Press; 2012. 
Cruz, C., Luna, G. A., Morales, R., & Coello, C. G. (2006). Gasto catastrófico en salud y elasticidades 
ingreso por tipo de gasto en servicios de salud en México. Bienestar y Política Social, 2(1), 
51–73. 
Cruz, Carlos, Gabriela Luna, Omar Stabridis, Carlo Coello, Cristina Mexicano and Raquel Morales. 
“Políticas Públicas Sectoriales e Intersectoriales para Mejorar los Niveles de Salud: El 
Financiamiento Público, las Políticas Intersectoriales y la Salud.” Department of Economics 
Working Paper. Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2006. In press 
Daw, J. R., & Morgan, S. G. (2012). Stitching the gaps in the Canadian public drug coverage 
patchwork? A review of provincial pharmacare policy changes from 2000 to 2010. Health 
Policy, 104(1), 19-26. 
Demers, V., Melo, M., Jackevicius, C., Cox, J., Kalavrouziotis, D., Rinfret, S., ... & Pilote, L. (2008). 
Comparison of provincial prescription drug plans and the impact on patients' annual drug 
expenditures. CMAj, 178(4), 405-409. 
Ekman, B. (2007). Catastrophic health payments and health insurance: Some counterintuitive 
evidence from one low-income country. Health policy, 83(2-3), 304-313. 
Gotsadze, G., Zoidze, A., & Rukhadze, N. (2009). Household catastrophic health expenditure: 
evidence from Georgia and its policy implications. BMC health services research, 9(1), 69. 
Goudge, J., Russell, S., Gilson, L., Molyneux, C., & Hanson, K. (2009). Household experiences of 
ill‐health and risk protection mechanisms. Journal of International Development: The Journal 
of the Development Studies Association, 21(2), 159-168. 




Health Canada. (2006). National Pharmaceutical Strategy Progress Report 
Hurley, J. 2010. Health Economics. Toronto: McGraw-Hill-Ryerson Journal of Political Economy, 
80:223-255. 
Ilunga-Ilunga, F., Levêque, A., Laokri, S., & Dramaix, M. (2015). Prevalence of catastrophic health 
expenditures for households: an example of medical attention for the treatment of severe 
childhood malaria in Kinshasa reference hospitals, Democratic Republic of Congo. Journal of 
infection and public health, 8(2), 136-144. 
Kapur, V., & Basu, K. (2005). Drug coverage in Canada: who is at risk? Health Policy, 71(2), 181-
193. 
Kimani, D. N. (2014). Out-of-pocket Health Expenditures and Household Poverty: Evidence from 
Kenya (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi)  
Knaul FM, Wong R, Arreola-Ornelas H. Household Spending and Impoverishment. Volume 1 of 
Financing Health in Latin America Series. 
Knaul, F. M., Arreola-Ornelas, H., Méndez-Carniado, O., & Torres, A. C. (2007). Impoverishing 
and catastrophic household health spending among families with older adults in Mexico: A 
health reform priority. In The Health of Aging Hispanics (pp. 237-262). Springer, New York, 
NY. 
Lara, J. L. A., & Gómez, F. R. (2011). Determining factors of catastrophic health spending in Bogota, 
Colombia. International journal of health care finance and economics, 11(2), 83-100. 
Merlis, M. (2002). Family out-of-pocket spending for health services: a continuing source of 
financial insecurity (pp. 4-12). New York: Commonwealth Fund. 
Merlis, M. (2003). Private long-term care insurance: who should buy it and what should they buy? 
Washington, DC: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 
Ngcamphalala, C. (2016). Financial health protection in Swaziland: an assessment of financial 
catastrophe and impoverishment from out-of-pocket payments (Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Cape Town). 
Nguyen, H. T., Rajkotia, Y., & Wang, H. (2011). The financial protection effect of Ghana National 
Health Insurance Scheme: evidence from a study in two rural districts. International journal 
for equity in health, 10(1), 4. 
Onwujekwe, O., Hanson, K., & Uzochukwu, B. (2012). Examining inequities in prevalence of 
catastrophic health expenditures on different healthcare services and health facilities in 
Nigeria. PloS one, 7(7), e40811. 
Perticara, M. (2008). Incidencia de los gastos de bolsillo en salud en siete países latinoamericanos. 
CEPAL. 
Sanmartin, C., Hennessy, D., Lu, Y., & Law, M. R. (2014). Trends in out-of-pocket health care 
expenditures in Canada, by household income, 1997 to 2009. Health reports, 25(4), 13. 
Sasidharan, L., & Menéndez, M. (2014). Partial proportional odds model—An alternate choice for 
analyzing pedestrian crash injury severities. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 72, 330-340. 
Séne, L. M., & Cissé, M. (2015). Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health and poverty nexus: 
evidence from Senegal. International journal of health economics and management, 15(3), 
307-328. 
Somkotra, T., & Lagrada, L. P. (2009). Which Households Are At Risk Of Catastrophic Health 
Spending: Experience In Thailand After Universal Coverage: Exploring the reasons why some 
households still incur high levels of spending—even under universal coverage—can help 
policymakers devise solutions. Health affairs, 28(Suppl1), w467-w478. 
101 
 
Soon, J. J. (2010). The determinants of students' return intentions: A partial proportional odds 
model. Journal of Choice Modelling, 3(2), 89-112. 
Statistics Canada. (2016). Survey of household spending, December 13, 2017. 
Su, T. T., Kouyaté, B., & Flessa, S. (2006). Catastrophic household expenditure for health care in a 
low-income society: a study from Nouna District, Burkina Faso. Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization, 84, 21-27. 
Sutherland, G., & Dinh, T. (2017). Understanding the gap: a pan-Canadian analysis of prescription 
drug insurance coverage. In Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada. 
Torres, A. C., & Knaul, F. (2003). Determinants of out-of-pocket health expenditure and its 
implications for universal insurance coverage in Mexico: 1992-2000. Kaleidoscope of the 
health: from the research to the policies and the policies to the action. México DF: 
FUNSALUD, 209-25. 
Wang, X., & Abdel-Aty, M. (2008). Analysis of left-turn crash injury severity by conflicting pattern 
using partial proportional odds models. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 40(5), 1674-1682. 
Waters, H. R., Anderson, G. F., & Mays, J. (2004). Measuring financial protection in health in the 
United States. Health policy, 69(3), 339-349. 
Williams, R. (2006). Generalized ordered logit/partial proportional odds models for ordinal 
dependent variables. The Stata Journal, 6(1), 58-82. 
Yasmin, S., & Eluru, N. (2013). Evaluating alternate discrete outcome frameworks for modeling 




THE IMPACT OF INSURANCE ON CATASTROPHIC OUT-OF-
POCKET PRESCRIPTION DRUG EXPENDITURES IN CANADA 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the expansion of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in Canada using a 
historical analysis. The chapter also simulates the impact of targeted and universal insurance across 
income levels, provinces, and age groups. The chapter concludes with relevant policy directions. 
5.2 Background: 
A recurring discourse in this thesis is that the existing patchwork system for prescription drug 
payments is inefficient and inequitable. In several Canadian provinces, households are burdened 
by out-of-pocket payments, resulting in impoverishment, or deepening of existing poverty (see 
chapter three). In summary, the existing system creates a barrier in terms of equity of access (where 
all individuals can fill their prescription drugs based on need and not on their ability to pay).  
A collective financial risk pooling mechanism and cross-subsidization like Medicare for 
primary care could protect Canadian households from catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug 
expenditures (COOPDE). The analysis in the previous two chapters has documented the key 
indicators (prevalence, intensity and determinants) needed to develop appropriate policy responses 
and an effective insurance program. This chapter simulates the impact of a collective financial risk 
pooling mechanism (targeted and universal insurance) on the distribution of COOPDE. With the 
increasing debate among politicians, physicians, academia and the general population around 
Pharmacare, this chapter presents relevant policy analysis.  
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According to the Government of Canada (2019), Pharmacare in Canada would involve a 
continuation of the existing patchwork system, with a more significant role for the federal 
government in ensuring both universality and equity. That is, under this proposal, the federal 
government would substantially fund the expansion of the existing system to ensure that a program 
similar to and guided by the principles of Medicare is created for prescription drugs. In this 
program, a national formulary of drugs would be covered, there would be no deductibles, out-of-
pocket payments would not exceed $5 per prescription, copayments would be $2 for essential 
medicines, and there would be an annual maximum of $100 per household (Government of 
Canada, 2019). In this chapter, I explore the effects of implementing a prepayment mechanism 
such as this version of Pharmacare. But first, I review relevant literature to explore why 
Pharmacare is not yet part of Medicare. 
5.3 The Barriers to the Inclusion of Pharmacare in Medicare  
As noted earlier, the enactment of the Canada Health Act (CHA) in 1984 eliminated the use of extra-billing 
and user fees for hospital services, physician services, and prescription drugs administered in a hospital 
setting. The literature documents that when the legislation was passed, the role of technology in the 
pharmaceutical industry was discounted and that the potential for a change in the demographics (ageing 
population) and income of the Canadian population was also not a top priority (Morgan & Boothe, 2016). 
Using a historical and contemporary perspective, this section explains the factors that led to the exclusion 
of outpatient prescription drugs in the CHA. 
5.3.1 The Role of Vested Interest Groups 
Morgan and Boothe (2016) documented that in the early 1980s, the introduction of Pharmacare 
was framed by the media and policymakers using a cost-benefit analysis framework. This 
framework was used to suggest that Pharmacare would substantially lower the benefits in the 
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existing universal hospital and physician care program and noting that the overall costs of 
expansion were neither feasible nor sustainable. These two claims influenced voters’ view of a 
universal and publicly funded prescription drug program. That is, the introduction of Pharmacare 
was framed as a significant redistribution of income to the poor from the rich. However, more 
recently, the Canadian electorate has been influenced by the growing prescription drug needs of 
an ageing population, increased cost-sharing in the existing patchwork of prescription drugs, and 
examples of successful Pharmacare systems diffusion in similarly advanced countries (Morgan et 
al., 2015). Morgan argues that these factors have shifted Canadians’ views, and, as a result, they 
have started to become more enthusiastic about the idea of a national Pharmacare program. 
In shifting Canadians’ views and facilitating policy change on prescription drugs in Canada, 
vested interest groups have played an important and well-documented role. For over 20 years, 
interest groups such as the Canadian Federation of Nurses Union (CFNU), Life and Health 
Insurance Association have continually advocated for a national pharmaceutical program. 
Notwithstanding this advocacy, little change has occurred (Gagnon, 2014). In 1997, an advisory 
panel chaired by Prime Minister Jean Chretien and called the National Forum on Health 
categorized pharmaceuticals as "medically necessary" and, hence, recommended the adoption of 
a universal public drug program (Morgan et al., 2015). Five years later, the commission on the 
Future of Health Care in Canada, chaired by Saskatchewan’s premier Roy Romanow, 
recommended that the federal and provincial governments collaborate to include medically 
necessary prescription drugs within the Canadian health care system. In his report, Romanow 
(2002) wrote that universal catastrophic drug coverage was the first step in including prescription 
drugs under the Canada Health Act. He suggested that a national agency be established to negotiate 
prices, monitor drug safety, and determine coverage decisions for the universal drug plan 
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(Romanow, 2002). In 2004, at the council of the Federation meeting, the provincial premiers and 
the federal government committed to creating the National Pharmaceuticals Strategy (NPS) 
(Morgan et al., 2015). However, the commitments never materialized: there was no political will, 
provincial budgets were stretched because the federal government had reduced federal health care 
allocations, and private insurance and pharmaceutical companies campaigned against any variation 
of national Pharmacare program (Gagnon, 2014; Hurley & Guindon, 2008; Law, Kratzer & Dhalla, 
2014; Morgan & Boothe, 2016).  
Further, the role of pharmaceutical companies cannot be underestimated in explaining why 
Pharmacare is not yet part of Medicare (Fierlbeck, 2011). Fierlbeck identified these companies’ 
increasing power and capacity as an essential factor behind Medicare’s inflexibility and its 
resulting inability to include prescription drugs. She noted that these companies have both the 
political power to evade the government's regulatory authority and strong ties with the medical 
community, enabling them to build support for their prescription drugs among physicians, 
primarily through training and educational programs. Since these pharmaceutical companies profit 
from the existing patchwork program, they are understandably resistant to change (Morgan & 
Boothe, 2016). 
5.3.2 Historical Perspective 
In the early 1900s, the epidemic spread of diseases such as small-pox, diphtheria, typhoid fever 
necessitated doctors to be residents in the rural municipalities of Saskatchewan, where Medicare 
was later birthed (Schnur & Hollenberg, 1966). The continuous pooling of funds through a 
progressive tax system ensured that the level of care provided by the resident doctors (municipal 
doctor scheme) was sustainable. In addition to the pooled resources for doctors, residents also 
pooled resources towards the building of hospital facilities (municipal hospital scheme) (Houston 
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& Massie, 2013). Together, the schemes became the Municipal Medical and Hospital Services Act 
(also known as the Matt Anderson Act) (Taylor, 1987). Neighbouring provinces such as Manitoba 
and Alberta had also made considerable progress in health care during the first 20 years of the 20th 
century (Houston & Massie, 2013). 
However, following the global economic recession of the 1930s and 1940s and the aftermath 
of the second war, access to basic medical care became the focus of the then fragile municipal 
health systems. Canadians experienced widespread unemployment, poverty, and a depressed 
economy. It was apparent that the federal government had to play an increased role, especially 
financially, to help the provinces sustain municipal health systems. Mackenzie King, the then 
prime minister, proposed to the cabinet that the federal government concentrate on unemployment 
insurance, health insurance, and social security for older people via a public pension (Taylor, 
1987). The prime minister was particularly influenced by Winston Churchill’s ideas on 
unemployment, social security, and health. In Saskatchewan, Premier Tommy Douglas had 
commissioned medical historian Dr. Henry Sigerist to assess the health care needs of the province. 
The Sigerist commission submitted a report on October 4, 1944, that recommended strengthening 
the financial risk pooling mechanism, building health infrastructures, and increasing the capacity 
of health care practitioners.  
However, notably absent in federal and provincial policy directions was the potential for 
technological advancement, especially in terms of the need for prescription drugs. According to 
Daw and Morgan (2012), policymakers were waiting for an increase in both the use and price of 
prescription drugs before implementing a national Pharmacare program. Nevertheless, several 
individual provinces developed drug subsidy systems for their social assistance recipients and 
vulnerable population such as seniors. At the time, prescription drugs were relatively inexpensive 
107 
 
because more generic drugs were available than patented drug brands. However, the situation 
changed in the 1970s – pharmaceutical innovation led to new patented drugs, and, both the use 
and price of drugs increased. Many Canadians could no longer afford the prescription drugs they 
needed. 
Following the Hall Commission's 1960 report to Prime Minister Pearson, the need for a 
universal health insurance program that extended beyond Medicare became apparent (Taylor, 
1987). However, because of the government change at the time and the concerns about cost, the 
commission’s recommendations to include prescription drugs under Medicare were not fully 
implemented. In summary, in the 20-30 years following the war, the political program was centred 
on improving the depressed economy, to the extent that only medically necessary doctor visits and 
hospitalization were prioritized. The Canada Health Act of 1984 also only includes drug coverage 
for drugs administered in hospitals. 
5.3.3 The Institutional Perspective   
Institutions can also be used to explain why Pharmacare has not been included in Medicare. 
Parsons (2007) defines institutions as the formal and informal rules, procedures, embedded norms, 
conventions, practices, or regulations in society. These institutions are indispensable in the 
formulation, design, adaptation, acceptance, and implementation of new policies. Additionally, 
according to North (1990), institutions are the rules of the game and the embedded norms that 
constrain human interactions in society. They may be created (e.g., the constitution) or may evolve 
(e.g., common law). Institutions have a self-reinforcing and locking in mechanism, which results 
in policy legacies, and when combined with the history, culture, time, and values of a particular 
people, form a trajectory for policies (policy inertia). This process is called path dependence 
(Pierson, 2000) because policies are affected by past legacies and feedback from pre-existing 
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policies (Wier & Skocpol, 1985). Specifically, path dependency implies that the predominant 
factor shaping policy at a given time (t) is the policy at previous time (t-1) (Rose, 1991). Moreover, 
according to Campbell (2004), path dependency implies that policies are adaptations at the margin 
of previous policies, which consequently constrain the bounds of the policy even if alternative 
policies are more efficient and effective. 
According to Miaoni (1997), the power of the middle class, party discipline as well as the 
decentralization of Canadian federalism enabled provincial jurisdiction over health. These factors 
consequently led to the inflexibility of Medicare to include prescription drugs over the years 
(Morgan & Boothe, 2016). That is, with less veto points in policy making, little policy change has 
occurred in Canada especially since the ideas of politicians have remained largely unfavourably 
toward Pharmacare.  
In her work on the political economy of 13 OECD countries, Mou (2013), wrote that in 
addition to path dependence, policy drifting explains the continued survival of Canada’s patchwork 
system of prescription drugs.  Policy drifting describes an institutional change that arises from 
inaction and no reform of existing policies (Beland, Roco & Waddan, 2016; Beland & Waddan, 
2012; Hacker, 2004; Thelen, 2004). According to Mou (2013), prescription drug programs in 
Canada have primarily remained the same over the years, with just minor changes at the margins, 
taking the form of changes in eligibility and cost-sharing requirements and listing and delisting of 
prescription drugs and services from the formulary. Thus, although evidence suggests that public 
sector insurance for prescription drugs would have substantial beneficial effects, private insurance 
still dominates the industry (Mou, 2013). 
In summary, the literature identifies three broad factors that can be used to explain the 
absence of Pharmacare in the basket of Medicare. First, in history, the then existing health system 
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was negatively affected by the global economic recession of the 1930s and 1940s coupled with the 
occurrence of the second world war. Hence, the priority of the then government was to ameliorate 
the consequences of the widespread unemployment and provide pension program for the 
population. Little priority was given to the need to include prescription drugs, which was at the 
time also inexpensive. Second, while vested interest groups unanimously bound by the desire to 
deliver a universal prescription drugs program have actively sought  opportunities to push for the 
materialization of Pharmacare, the push for the materialization of Pharmacare has been stalled by 
a lack of political will, the presence of a strong private insurance system and pharmaceutical 
companies, which are motivated by the profits the existing system provides them. Lastly, the 
literature identifies that, the decentralization of the Canadian federalism, provincial jurisdictional 
power and party discipline have fuelled a path dependent policy trajectory that has excluded a 
universal prescription drugs program in Canada. 
 
 5.4 Methodology 
The most definitive work on the role of insurance in catastrophic health payments was done by 
Saksena, Xu and Carrin (2006). The scholars defined total potential prevalence from out-of-pocket 
health payments and then measured the effect of insurance on the prevalence of catastrophic 
payments. Total potential prevalence is the combination of both observed prevalence (the observed 
prevalence among those who reported the need for health care and used health care), and potential 
prevalence (the prevalence among those who reported the need for health care but could not use it 
because of prohibitive costs).  
This study simulates the effect of an insurance program (targeted and universal) on the 
prevalence of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drugs payments in Canada. The method of 
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the current study was similar in many ways to Saskena, Xu and Carrin’s (2006) research.  
However, because the Survey of Household Spending (SHS) did not collect data on the self-
reported need for prescription drugs and other health status variables, only observed prevalence is 
used here. Thus, this study analyzed the effect of insurance (targeted and universal) on the 
observed prevalence of COOPDE. Compared to a universal insurance program, which covers 
every income category, targeted insurance is an insurance program for the working poor and those 
in lower-income categories. As in Saksena, Xu and Carrin (2006), we assumed that the insurance 
programs cover a percentage of the out-of-pocket payments for prescription, without caps. We 
take the revenue-neutral principle in the simulations. That is, we assume the cost of the new drug 
insurance is paid by an additional tax on only higher-income groups. We use the required tax 
revenue to calculate the tax rate of an additional tax that is imposed on only the individuals in the 
upper two income categories (RPL-AVE and >AVE). The decrease in income for these higher-
income individuals means a reduction in these households’ capacity to pay.  
 5.5 Results 
The pre-insurance and post-insurance results are presented in this section. Three scenarios are 
simulated, and the results are presented across income distribution, age, and provinces. The 
analysis at the three thresholds 3.4%, 6.73%, and 12% are given below. The scenarios simulated 
are as follows 1) an insurance program that covers 100% of out-of-pocket prescription drug 
payments for households in the working poor and absolutely poor categories only; 2) an insurance 
program that covers 50% of out-of-pocket prescription drug payments for the whole population; 
and 3) an insurance program that covers 100% of out-of-pocket prescription drug payments for the 
whole population.  
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Figure 5.1 below shows the distinct prevalence of catastrophic spending across income 
categories in scenario 2) – when 50% of out-of-pocket prescription drug payments for the whole 
population is covered by an additional insurance. After the introduction of a prepayment insurance 
program, there was a significant decrease in the observed prevalence of catastrophic out-of-pocket 
prescription drug spending. In Figure 5.1 for the working poor (ABL-RPL), the prevalence at the 
3.4% threshold fell from 22.72% to 11.96% and from 3.23% to 0.33% at the 12% threshold. A 
significant reduction in prevalence is observed for the relative poverty line to average income 
category (RPL-AVE), with the difference at the 3.4% threshold being the highest, and the 
difference at the 12% threshold the lowest. These findings suggest that a drug insurance program 
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The tax rate associated with the implementation of this proposed insurance program in 
scenario 2) is 0.34% on the households who are not in the working poor or absolutely poor 
categories. This tax contribution translates to a yearly tax contribution of around $255 for 
households with a gross income of $75,000 and an annual tax contribution of about $102 for those 
with a gross income of approximately $30,000. The overall observed prevalence of catastrophic 
spending in Canada fell by 58.5% at the 3.4% threshold, 75.5% at the 6.73% threshold and 81.4% 
at the 12% threshold.  
For age categories in Figure 5.3, the drug insurance program significantly reduces the 
prevalence of financial catastrophe among seniors by as much as 17.8% at the 3.4% threshold. It 
implies that older individuals would benefit more from the insurance program than younger 
individuals. For provincial distribution, Figure 5.2 shows the pre-intervention (left) and post-
intervention (right) prevalence across provinces.  The figure shows that the insurance program 












The above analysis has documented the impact of a prepayment health-financing scheme on 
the distribution of financial catastrophe across the whole Canadian population. Indeed, such a 
program has merit in substantially reducing the prevalence of catastrophic expenditure for the most 
vulnerable individuals in the country including seniors, the working poor, and Quebec residents. 
The insurance program is critical, mainly because its impact is highest for those at the highest risk 
of incurring financial catastrophe when they buy prescription drugs. Interestingly, the cost of this 
universal program would be reasonably affordable, as it represents a low financial burden for the 
income categories being taxed. Although even with new insurance, the prevalence figures are still 
highest among the most vulnerable, a reduction in the cost-sharing payments to which these 
vulnerable people are exposed ensures that out-of-pocket payments for these people are limited 
(Saksena, Xu & Carrin, 2006).   
Against this backdrop, this study also simulated targeted insurance for only individuals 
whose earning fall below the relative poverty line, i.e. scenario 1). The results indicate that the 
affordability of such a targeted program is even higher than that of the insurance program earlier 
presented. With a tax rate of 0.03%, the tax burden of the program’s financiers is very minimal, 
but the benefit is significant for its beneficiaries.  Across provinces, the percentage reduction in 
the prevalence of financial catastrophe is highest in Quebec (59%), followed by PEI (46.52%). In 
the Prairies, Saskatchewan had a prevalence reduction of 30%, and Alberta 34%.  
An insurance program that covers 100% of out-of-pocket payments without caps for all 
population, i.e. scenario 3), would result in a tax increase of 0.69% percent for individuals who 
are with higher income. For example, a household with a pre-tax income of $75,000 would pay a 
little over $500 per year towards the program. Overall, then, the argument that Pharmacare would 
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be cost-prohibitive does not hold up in light of this figures. The results of this chapter have shown 
that the first step toward Pharmacare is neither cost-intensive nor unsustainable.  
To ensure the robustness of the results, I simulated two other scenarios of partial insurance 
programs for the population, which cover 25% and 75% of the out-of-pocket payments. The results 
are presented in the appendix of this chapter for thresholds 3.4% and 6.73%. The findings based 
on these scenarios are consistent with those presented above.   
Figure 5.3: Impact of universal insurance (50% of out-of-pocket payments) across age 
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This study argues that a universal and comprehensive insurance for prescription drugs as opposed 
to a patch-work system may improve access and overall equity of the health care system. Other 
scholars have also concluded that a universal Pharmacare program for Canada is efficient and will 
improve equity in the long run (Adam & Smith, 2017; Canadian Health Coalition, 2007; Gagnon 
& Hébert, 2010; Morgan, Daw & Law, 2013; Morgan et al., 2015).  A recent study by Hajizadeh 
& Edmonds (2020) also documented that out-of-pocket prescription drugs spending is a clear 
antithesis of the financial protection that universal health coverage seeks to achieve and it is 
imperative for Canada as a country to institute a universal Pharmacare program.  
One of this thesis’s key conclusion is that instituting universal coverage for drugs is not cost-
prohibitive (Roberts, Hsiao & Reich, 2015). The literature also provides supporting evidence. On 
the supply side, economies of scale from bulk purchasing of drugs would reduce the cost to 
consumers. As well, the creation of a drug list like the WHO’s essential medicines (formulary) is 
necessary for consideration. With the strong administrative capacity and distribution channels of 
provincial drug programs, government has a higher chance of success in prescription drugs 
purchase, pricing and distribution with minimal waste and unhealthy competition motivated by 
profit from private companies (Laurell, 2010; Ramesh, Wu & Howlett, 2015; Robinson & White, 
2001; Sengupta, 2013). A public system could also absorb the shocks from marginal costs and 
expand the benefits to the vulnerable population (Sengupta, 2013). Therefore, the large out-of-
pocket prescription drug payments in Canada do not indicate that private insurance companies 
should play a more significant role; instead, they draw attention to the consequences of relying on 
private insurance (Sachs, 2012; Sengupta, 2013). Hence, the solution to the policy challenge of 




Although, based on the results of the empirical analysis of this thesis, indeed there is the 
need for a comprehensive and universal program that prevents the occurrence of financial 
catastrophe in the first place, there exists significant barrier to the implementation of such a 
program in Canada. The median voter is somewhat indifferent, and all those who experience 
significant burden are in the lower income distribution (Mou, 2013; Sanmartin eta l., 2014). The 
needed support from individuals as well as policy makers might not be substantial now. In 
summary, although, the evidence-based conclusion will be an increased call for universal 
Pharmacare, perhaps a program targeted at those individuals presently falling through the cracks 
might be more feasible in the short-run.   
According to the World Health Organization (2010, p. 9), “Countries must raise sufficient 
funds, reduce the reliance on direct payments to finance services, and improve efficiency and 
equity.” Against this background, this chapter presented a valuable route to the pre-paid pooling 
of resources. We used a progressive tax system that involved taxing those who can afford to pay. 
It has been established that consumption tax is counter intuitive as it burdens the already poor and 
has little influence on the already rich; hence, the progressive nature of this income tax scheme is 
directly linked to progress towards UHC (Reeves et al., 2015).  
In conclusion, using the UHC cube, one important question arises what should be Canada’s 
next step in terms of coverage expansion of services, population groups, payments, and at what 
cost? As several authors have already argued, one crucial role of UHC in health policy is to protect 
against catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments for the vulnerable (Abiiro & De Allegri, 2015; 
Palmer et al., 2004). This thesis confirms that in the long run for the Canadian health care system, 
a universal Pharmacare program may provide financial protection and eliminate impoverishment 
as well as improve equity. In a short-term however, coverage expansion for essential prescription 
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Table 5.1: Simulation analysis of partial insurance at 3.4% and 6.73%  
 3.4% 6.73% 
 25% off 75% off 25% off 75% off 
Age 
(years) 
    
< 35  4.92 3.56 1.94 1.08 
35-50  5.15 4.17 1.05 0.94 
50-65 13.02 10.82 5.29 4.47 
≥65 29.30 21.85 11.96 9.29 
     
Per capita 
PL income 
    
>Ave 7.61 7.61 2.95 2.95 
RPL-AVE 17.82 17.82 7.29 7.29 
ABL-RPL 20.06 2.19 6.60 0.25 
BAPL 9.46 1.92 3.40 0.49 
     
Provinces     
NL 15.35 11.61 6.75 4.81 
PEI 17.27 12.34 8.22 5.78 
NS 14.68 10.72 6.28 4.53 
NB 17.25 13.77 6.22 4.45 
PQ 21.79 15.54 7.90 5.91 
ONT 8.35 7.05 3.56 3.10 
MB 16.58 14.55 8.34 6.66 
SK 16.38 13.19 7.33 5.98 
AB 9.55 8.41 3.69 2.70 









This chapter summarizes the results of this study. Policy implications as well as contributions to 
knowledge are also presented. Finally, this chapter concludes with the study’s limitations and areas 
of further research. 
6.2 Summary 
This research used the 2016 Statistics Canada Survey of Household Spending to investigate the 
distribution of and factors associated with catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug 
expenditures (COOPDE) in Canada. Finally, a simulation analysis of the effect of insurance on the 
distribution of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug payments is also presented. For this 
study, we used the capacity to pay approach to calculate the catastrophic effects. A logistic and 
partial proportional odds model are employed in the study of the factors associated with 
catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription drug spending. The results of this study have substantially 
increased the understanding of financial risk protection in prescription drug payments in Canada.   
The study revealed two important findings. First, Canadian residents who are seniors, as well 
as individuals who are working poor, are disproportionately burdened with catastrophic payments 
when they fill their prescription drugs. Second, in the existing public-private mix of insurance 
system for prescription drugs, financial protection across provinces vary in terms of the breadth 
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(types of drugs covered), length (individuals covered) and depth (cost-sharing mechanism) of the 
UHC cube.  
In designing appropriate policy responses to any policy challenge, the first step for 
policymakers is the understanding of the dynamics of the policy challenge. In the case of financial 
catastrophe and impoverishment in Canada, this implies having information on the prevalence and 
intensity across various subpopulation groups.  Importantly, the factors that put Canadians at high 
risk of experiencing financial catastrophe and impoverishment when they fill their prescription 
drugs. In other words, understanding the characteristics of a Canadian resident who suffers 
financial catastrophe is necessary to design targeted social policies to combat such impacts. The 
results of this are captured in chapter four of this thesis.  
While achieving universal health coverage that eliminates user fees and promote cross-
subsidization of financial risk is no easy task, chapter four of this thesis shows that the existence 
of OOPDE as a health financing scheme has a negative effect on the most vulnerable (individuals 
who are older, have lower educational levels, and working poor) of the Canadian population. In 
Canada, it is also clear from the results that equity of access that stems from the WHO’s definition 
of universal health coverage involving people’s ability to access their needed prescription drugs 
based on need and not ability to pay is not feasible without an alternative funding scheme (WHO, 
2010).  
It is expected that when households purchase insurance plans, it is to protect against 
COOPDE. However, as seen in the findings of the Partial Proportional Odds Model, the predicted 
probability of incurring COOPDE is highest in Quebec across all income categories (especially 
among the working poor) despite the presence of mandatory insurance. Hence, the presence of 
health insurance does not necessarily imply equity in access. In this regard, an alternative funding 
127 
 
scheme, preferably tax based that allows for cross-subsidization aimed at reducing/eliminating out-
of-pocket prescription drug payments is by the empirical evidence presented above, the next step 
towards Pharmacare in Canada. Doing this means that there will be equity in access and financial 
protection for the most disadvantaged in Canada. 
6.3 Policy Implications 
The finding from this study has shown that the financial risk that Canadians face when they fill 
their prescription drugs is a significant threat to their welfare in general.  This limited financial 
protection in Canada is a valid health policy concern. One key message from the thesis is that the 
reliance on out-of-pocket payment financing in Canada for prescription drugs is regressive and 
should be reduced and ultimately eliminated. Like all progressive health care systems, Canada 
should strive to achieve universal health coverage to attain financial risk protection against 
catastrophic and impoverishing out-of-pocket prescription drug payments. 
The results of chapter five of this thesis have presented policy options. Of importance is 
targeted insurance for the working poor as a first step. The simulation shows a 40.63% reduction 
in the prevalence of COOPDE (at the 6.73% threshold) in the province of Quebec. Across the 
Atlantic provinces, this targeted insurance will reduce the prevalence of COOPDE by an average 
of 41.26%, and the value is 30.72% reduction for the Prairie provinces. Insurance that covers 100% 
of out-of-pocket payments for all the population will result in a tax rate of 0.69% percent for 
individuals who are of relatively higher income. E.g. a household with a gross income of $75,000 
will pay a little over $500 per year towards the program. 
In both scenarios, there is the need for an expansion of the patchwork insurance system 
towards a more comprehensive universal insurance package. For the historical first time, this study 
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was able to provide impoverishment estimates from out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures. 
Following from the absolute poverty line estimates in Canada, about 73,000 individuals in Canada 
are brought into poverty when they fill their prescription drugs. The significant implication of this 
is that individuals whose income is close to absolute poverty line should be protected against 
regressive cost-sharing payments via a targeted or universal insurance program. Further, the 
findings of this study showed that seniors are most likely to incur catastrophic out-of-pocket 
prescription drugs. Therefore, there is also the need to institute a targeted program that reduces the 
financial risk seniors face from prescription drug payments. 
On the supply side, due to health insurance information asymmetry, patients are incentivized 
to use unnecessary high-technology health care alternatives as well as more costly prescription 
drugs, which ultimately increases out-of-pocket payments and financial risks. The government 
should create a much-needed national formulary of essential medicines and negotiate with 
pharmaceutical companies to find a way of reducing costs for those essential drugs for Canadian 
residents. This solution has merit in reducing overall health care expenditure as well as financial 
risks (Lindelow & Wagstaff, 2005; Sengupta 2013).  
6.4 Study Limitations 
There are some limitations to this study. The first limitation is the cross-sectional survey data used 
in this research. As with cross-sectional data, there is a possibility of recall bias where respondents 
might not be able to accurately recall pertinent retrospective expenses. Self-reported data bias may 
have led respondents to exaggerate or understate their private information due, for example, to 
their mood. There might also be a selection bias. Although the survey is designed to be a 
representation of the whole population, some locations might have been underrepresented in the 
sample, while other locations might have been overrepresented.  
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Further, the Survey of Household Spending did not collect some important information such 
as health status information, insurance data, travel costs and health care need data. This 
information could have been useful in analyzing the impact of out-of-pocket payments on, for 
example, cost-related adherence. Also, valuable patterns regarding the relationship between health 
care need, insurance status and catastrophic out-of-pocket payments could have been assessed. 
Furthermore, because we used the household level data of the Survey of Household Spending, we 
projected household head characteristics to the other members of the family for analysis purposes. 
This projection might not necessarily hold in all cases, although it is an acceptable practice in the 
literature. Finally, the simulation analysis assumed no extra administration cost of running the new 
insurance programs. There might be administrative costs that limit the affordability of such 
programs. 
6.5 Future Research Directions 
A study of the impact of out-of-pocket prescription drug spending on financial catastrophe and 
impoverishment in Canada is noteworthy. However, while this study’s methodology is very viable 
in highlighting the extent of vertical inequality from prescription drugs payment in Canada, it is 
very important to note that some households might not have filled their prescription drugs at all 
because of prohibitive costs. Therefore, we only analyzed the observed prevalence in this thesis. 
Future research should model the impact on individuals who would have otherwise filled their 
prescription drugs, but due to costs, they could not. This future research direction is referred to as 
potential prevalence. In this regard, there is a need for data on health care needs and health status 
in general. The real prevalence (potential and observed prevalence) will show the actual 
distribution and intensity of the policy problem. Further, future research can model the impact of 
a Pharmacare program that is like Medicare and not the existing patchwork system as done here.   
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Further studies can construct a special panel data set that combines the Survey of Household 
Spending, the Canadian Community Health Survey (provides rich information on cost-related non-
adherence and coping strategies that households use to deal with filling their prescription drugs) 
and the Canadian Rx Atlas (provides rich data on the use of and expenditure on prescription drugs 
across provinces, drug plans and therapeutic categories). This robust data set can be used to assess 
the change process and trends in catastrophic spending on prescription drugs over time for 
households and provinces. The important link between catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription 
spending, household coping mechanisms and cost-related non-adherence can then be established. 
Hence, persistent and/or occasional catastrophic patterns discovered from the link can be used to 
inform the effective policy design to solve the policy issue.  
Finally, future research can use a methodological triangulation that involves a qualitative 
approach to answering the research questions analysed quantitatively in this thesis. It will be 
important to assess how the results of the qualitative analysis converges or diverges from those in 
this thesis. The triangulation approach also has merit in presenting an in-depth, enriched and 
increase understanding/perspective to the policy issue of catastrophic out-of-pocket prescription 
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